

THE UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE'S EFFECTIVENESS
IN BOSNIA: CAMPAIGN PLANNING AND PEACEKEEPING

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

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1996

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
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1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)	2. REPORT DATE 7 June 1996	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis, 31 July 95-7 June 96		
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE UNPROFOR's Effectiveness in Bosnia: Campaign Planning and Peacekeeping		5. FUNDING NUMBERS		
6. AUTHOR(S) Major Michael J. Fallon, U.S. Army				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD, 1 Reynolds Avenue Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER		
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)		10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER		
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 4		
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited		12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE A		
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) This paper evaluates the effectiveness of United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina under LTG Rose's leadership from January 1994 to January 1995. It examines in detail, Bosnia-Herzegovina Command's (BHC) plan to accomplish its mandated mission and the strategic goals necessary to achieve UNPROFOR's desired endstate. BHC effectively protected the six UN-declared safe areas against Bosnian Serb offensives during this time period. It also effectively implemented numerous cease-fire agreements between the warring factions and began the process of restoring utilities and services to Sarajevo and central Bosnia. This study concludes that BHC operations were effective in 1994 and that peacekeepers executed their mandated military mission, and accomplished their campaign plan's strategic goals, despite not achieving the UN's ultimate objective of a negotiated peace settlement. This paper also concludes that campaign planning is at least as important to the success of peacekeeping operations as it is to theater combat operations. BHC's use of a campaign plan resulted in a significant improvement for UN operations in Bosnia.				
14. SUBJECT TERMS Bosnia, LTG Rose, Campaign Plan, UNPROFOR		15. NUMBER OF PAGES 101		
		16. PRICE CODE		
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT Unlimited	

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
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
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
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ABSTRACT

THE UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE'S EFFECTIVENESS IN BOSNIA:
CAMPAIGN PLANNING AND PEACEKEEPING by Major Michael J. Fallon, US
Army, 101 Pages.

This paper evaluates the effectiveness of United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina under Lieutenant General Rose's leadership from January 1994 to January 1995. It examines in detail, Bosnia-Herzegovina Command's (BHC's) plan to accomplish its mandated mission and the strategic goals necessary to achieve UNPROFOR's desired end state.

BHC effectively protected the six UN-declared safe areas against Bosnian Serb offensives during this time period. It also effectively implemented numerous cease-fire agreements between the warring factions and began the process of restoring utilities and services to Sarajevo and central Bosnia.

This study concludes that BHC operations were effective in 1994 and that peacekeepers executed their mandated military mission and accomplished their campaign plan's strategic goals, despite not achieving the UN's ultimate objective of a negotiated peace settlement.

This paper also concludes that campaign planning is at least as important to the success of peacekeeping operations as it is to theater combat operations. BHC's use of a campaign plan resulted in a significant improvement in the coordination between the political, peacekeeping, and humanitarian components of the UN in Bosnia.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to acknowledge the encouragement and sacrifices of my wife, Sylvia, both during the preparation of this thesis and during the time I was deployed to Sarajevo.

I am grateful for the assistance of the many officers, soldiers, and liaison personnel who have contributed time and material over the last twelve months. Mr. John Hunt, Lieutenant Colonel Chip Schleider and Lieutenant Colonel Michael Johnson offered valuable advice throughout. Lieutenant Colonel John Sray and Major Steve Stewart helped refresh my memory of life in Bosnia-Herzegovina Command (BHC) during the time period of this study. Errors and omissions are mine alone.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

APC	Armored Personnel Carrier
B-H	Bosnia-Hercegovina
BHC	Bosnia-Hercegovina Command
BiH	Bosnian Muslim Army
BSA	Bosnian Serb Army
DMA	Division of Management and Administration
ECMM	European Community Monitoring Mission
FC	Force Commander
FM	Field Manual
FRY	Former Republic of Yugoslavia
HV	Croatian Army
HVO	Croatian Defense Council (Bosnian Croat Army)
JNA	Former Yugoslavian Army
LOC	Lines of Communication
MT	Metric Tons
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
PIO	Public Information Office
PSYOP	Psychological Operation
PTT	Post, Telephone and Telegraph
SAS	Special Air Service
SCR	Security Council Resolution

SRSG	Special Representative to the Secretary General
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNAPFOR	United Nations Aid Protection Force
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNMO	United Nations Military Observer
UNPA	United Nations Protected Area
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

It's time for me to go.¹

Lieutenant General Briquemont,
Farewell Speech

The purpose of this study is to examine United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) military actions in Bosnia-Herzegovina and to evaluate their effectiveness. This paper will analyze Bosnia-Herzegovina Command (BHC) operations under Lieutenant General Rose's leadership from January 1994 to January 1995. Many people assume that UNPROFOR's role in Bosnia was a dismal failure during this time period. This study will show that BHC operations were effective in 1994 and that they executed their mandated military mission and accomplished their campaign plan's strategic goals, despite not achieving the United Nation's ultimate objective of a negotiated peace settlement. This paper's focus is on BHC accomplishments and deficiencies during Lieutenant General Rose's tenure. Most people are unaware that 1994 was a high-water mark for the United Nations in delivering humanitarian aid throughout Bosnia. BHC effectively protected the six UN-declared safe areas against Bosnian Serb offensives during this time period. In 1994, BHC implemented the Sarajevo cease-fire and heavy weapons withdrawal between the Muslims and Bosnian Serbs, resulting in the city's longest period of peace since the war began in 1992. BHC

implemented similar cease-fire and withdrawal plans between the Muslims and Bosnian Croats and began the process of restoring utilities and services to Sarajevo and central Bosnia. Although BHC effectively completed its assigned military missions, the absence of a permanent UN negotiated peace settlement painted the entire UNPROFOR mission as an unmitigated failure. This paper examines what did and did not work for UN military forces in Bosnia, in hopes of applying these lessons to future peacekeeping operations in a highly volatile environment.

Outline

Chapter one briefly reviews the 16-month history of UNPROFOR and sets the scene prior to January 1994. It reviews secondary literature on peacekeeping operations in Bosnia, details the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions, defines UNPROFOR's mandate and BHC's mission, explains the warring faction's objectives, and defines key terms used in the study. Chapter two chronologically covers the key events of 1994 and BHC's campaign plan to accomplish its assigned missions. Chapter three analyzes the reactions of the warring factions, with a particular focus on the Bosnian Serb Army and its capabilities and limitations. Chapter four assesses BHC's achievements and deficiencies during Lieutenant General Rose's command and evaluates the effectiveness and creativity of UN tactics against the warring factions in Bosnia. The final chapter lists the conclusions drawn from the study and provides lessons learned and recommendations for commanders and their staff in the conduct of peacekeeping missions in a volatile environment.

Literature Review and Methodology

There is an absence of military literature on the war in the Balkans and a corresponding absence of praise for UNPROFOR operations in extant literature. Current literature on the war in the former Yugoslavia can be loosely divided into two categories. The vast majority of books and articles adopt either a macroview of ethnic tensions and the resultant disintegration of Yugoslavia or a microview of the human rights violations and humanitarian suffering of individual citizens in Bosnia. Books on the macroview are typically written by academics and are best exemplified by Branka Magas' The Destruction of Yugoslavia and Susan Woodward's Balkan Tragedy. Macroview literature tends to examine the conflict on an international scale and interpret its impact in worldwide terms. It usually concludes that UNPROFOR operations were ineffective and exacerbated the conflict. Books adopting the microview are almost exclusively written by journalists and provide a bird's-eye view of human misery and suffering in the former Yugoslavia. Microview literature is characterized as fervently anti-Serb, and uniformly portrays UNPROFOR as inept and a total failure. Examples of this form of literature are David Rieff's Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Failure of the West and Ed Vulliamy's Seasons in Hell. Students of peacekeeping and military operations in Bosnia are not served by either the macroview or microview of the war. Literature covering the tactics, techniques, and procedures of the warring factions in Bosnia, as well as UNPROFOR operations, is practically nonexistent.

The void of military literature on the war in Bosnia was briefly filled in early 1993 by Major General Lewis MacKenzie's Peacekeeper and Lieutenant Colonel Bob Stewart's Broken Lives. Both of these books are practically military diaries of the authors' tours in Bosnia. They provide an excellent military point of view of the early months of the war in Bosnia but conclude in 1992 prior to significant changes in UNPROFOR's mandate and force structure. This paper, based on UN documents, UNPROFOR correspondence, and papers, as well as notes from BHC staff members, will be a unique and original contribution on the topic of military peacekeeping operations in Bosnia. It will utilize a dialectic methodology based on original documentation and first-hand interviews to examine BHC's successes and failures and will attempt to demonstrate that UNPROFOR was far more successful than it has been given credit for.

Background

Christmas 1993 in Sarajevo was a somber time for General Francis Briquemont and his beleaguered United Nations forces stationed in Bosnia-Herzegovina (B-H). The Belgian General was the commander of the 13,042 troops assigned to BHC and had spent the greater part of December at his forward headquarters in Sarajevo, a former guesthouse for Marshall Tito known as the Residency. Sarajevo at this time was under a savage and continuous artillery attack. At the height of the attack, approximately 1,200 rounds per day impacted in the city. General Briquemont was the third commander of UN forces in Bosnia, and like all of his predecessors, he was about to relinquish command early.

The United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) consisted of a Croatia Command, Macedonia Command, and BHC subordinate to the Force Commander (FC) French General Jean Cot stationed in Zagreb, Croatia. UN command of Bosnia-Herzegovina was regarded as a poisoned chalice consisting of an undermanned and underarmed United Nations force with the unenviable mission of facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid in the middle of a combat zone. This muddled situation was the result of BHC's ad hoc origin and extensive mission creep over an eighteen-month period.

UNPROFOR was a force designated by the UN Security Council in November 1991 to deploy to UN Protected Areas (UNPAs) in Croatia in an attempt to create conditions of peace and security in the region. Yugoslavia began its slide toward disintegration on 25 June 1991 when Croatia and Slovenia declared independence from Yugoslavia. The Yugoslavian Army, primarily a Serb-controlled force, fought to preserve the federation by forcibly reintegrating the republics. The war in Slovenia ended on 18 July 1991 when the Yugoslavian Army and Slovenia reached an agreement that in essence gave Slovenia quasi-independence.

The Yugoslav Army began fighting in Croatia on 2 July 1991, and bitter fighting continued throughout the year. UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar had announced on 15 November 1991 that he would send Special Representative Cyrus Vance to Yugoslavia to explore the feasibility of a UN peacekeeping mission. On 25 November 1991, Yugoslav and Croatian Army leaders agreed to a comprehensive cease-fire as a prerequisite for a UN peacekeeping force in Croatia. The cease-fire was immediately broken and fighting continued in Croatia as the UN began the slow process of organizing a peacekeeping force. The UN

mandate to deploy peacekeepers in Croatia was called the Vance Plan. It called for the Yugoslav Army to withdraw from areas of Croatia that it had seized, to be replaced by UN forces. Fourteen thousand UN peacekeepers would occupy Serb-controlled areas of Croatia called UNPAs as soon as a cease-fire took hold. The Croatian Serbs in the UNPAs wanted to be annexed by Serbia. The force, called the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), began to deploy to Croatia in March 1992. In the interests of neutrality, the headquarters for UNPROFOR was placed in Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, three hundred and fifty kilometers from Croatia. As soon as UNPROFOR headquarters arrived in Sarajevo, war broke out in Bosnia. The first UNPROFOR Commander Indian Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar was trapped in war-torn Bosnia commanding peacekeeping operations in Croatia. UNPROFOR was about to experience mission creep by expanding its operations into Bosnia.

On 29 February 1992 (a leap year), Bosnians voted for independence from Yugoslavia. Heavy fighting broke out between Bosnian Serb forces led by Radovan Karadzic and forces loyal to Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic. The Yugoslav Army began to withdraw from Bosnia to Serbia, after giving their heavy weapons and equipment to Bosnian Serb forces. On 27 April 1992, the remaining Yugoslavian republics of Serbia and Montenegro proclaimed the establishment of a new Yugoslavia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). Bosnian President Izetbegovic and his largely Muslim forces lost large areas of Bosnia to the superior armed Bosnian Serbs. As "all-out war" erupted in Sarajevo, the United Nations agreed to undertake relief operations in the city. On 6 June 1992, the Bosnian Serbs agreed to turn over

Sarajevo Airport to the UN to allow them to bring in relief supplies. Security Council Resolution 758 expanded UNPROFOR's mission to include reopening Sarajevo Airport for relief supplies and authorizing an additional one thousand troops to establish a UNPROFOR contingent in Bosnia to run the airport.²

The first UNPROFOR commander assigned to Bosnia was Canadian Major General Lewis MacKenzie. He believes, in retrospect, that the United Nations made a big mistake in not renaming UN forces in Bosnia in June 1992.³ United Nations Protection Force was an appropriate title for peacekeepers in Croatia, armed and manned to protect designated UN Protected Areas. It was not an appropriately descriptive title for UN forces in Bosnia. It conveyed the wrong impression of the UN's mission in Bosnia. The primary mission for UN forces in Bosnia has never been to protect noncombatants. It has always been to provide military assistance to the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and approved organizations and agencies involved in humanitarian activities in Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁴ A more appropriate and mission descriptive title would have been United Nations Aid Protection Force (UNAPFOR). Bosnian Muslims in Sarajevo were understandably disappointed when UNPROFOR forces arrived and did little more than operate Sarajevo Airport and escort humanitarian aid convoys. The resulting bitterness from both the Bosnian Serb and Muslim populace, as well as inflammatory comments about the warring factions, led to Major General MacKenzie's recall after three months in command.

French General Philippe Morillon assumed command of UNPROFOR troops in Bosnia in October 1992. The force had been officially

designated UNPROFOR B-H Command in September, and when additional peacekeepers deployed to Macedonia in December, UNPROFOR's mandate expanded once again to form Macedonia Command. General Morillon had limited assets and initially argued fiercely against the use of UN authorized force to support humanitarian relief operations throughout Bosnia. In March 1993, Bosnian Serb forces conducted savage attacks against towns in eastern Bosnia. General Morillon, in an attempt to publicize their plight, penetrated the Bosnian Serb siege of Srebrenica and refused to leave the town until the siege was lifted. His gesture shocked his superiors and resulted in his premature recall to France in June 1993.

Serb aircraft dropped bombs on Muslim villages east of Srebrenica during March 1993. As a result of the heavy civilian casualties in the region, NATO agreed to enforce a "no-fly zone" over Bosnia effective 12 April 1993. Four days later the Security Council declared Srebrenica a "safe area" and demanded that all armed attacks or hostile acts against it cease. BHC deployed 170 troops to Srebrenica to demilitarize the Muslim-controlled town and to assist in the delivery of humanitarian assistance. One month later the Security Council expanded the "safe area" concept to include, in addition to Srebrenica, the towns of Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde, Bihac, and their surroundings. UNPROFOR's mandate was expanded to secure safe areas, to deter attacks against them, and to occupy key points on the ground in the area. The UN was authorized to employ force in self-defense against bombardments against the safe areas. After this resolution was passed, General Morillon's superior, Force Commander Lieutenant General

Lars-Eric Wahlgren (Sweden), notified the Secretary General that an additional BHC troop requirement of 34,000 was required to deter safe area attacks. The Security Council opted instead for a "light option" and authorized a troop reinforcement of 7,600 troops.⁵

On 12 July 1993, Lieutenant General Francis Briquemont (Belgium) assumed command of UNPROFOR troops in Bosnia. During his tenure of command, the siege of Sarajevo was tightened and armed attacks against UN convoys increased. In October 1993, a Danish driver was killed and nine other UN personnel were wounded during an attack on a Bosnian relief convoy. As a result, the UN suspended convoys throughout most of Bosnia for a month. The Geneva Peace Talks among Croatian President Tudjman, Serbian President Milosevic, and Bosnian President Izetbegovic continued over the summer and into the autumn of 1993. The Bosnian Serbs intensified artillery barrages against Sarajevo in the weeks prior to meetings in Geneva to force the Bosnian Muslims to capitulate at the bargaining table. In December 1993, France, the UK, Spain, Canada, and Belgium announced that they would reassess their participation in UNPROFOR in the spring of 1994 if no settlement was reached by that time. Lieutenant General Briquemont requested a six-month tour curtailment in December 1993, stating "I don't read the Security Council resolutions any more because they don't help me. There is a fantastic gap between the resolutions and the means available to commanders in the field."⁶

On 5 January 1994, Lieutenant General Sir Michael Rose (UK) was appointed head of the United Nations peacekeeping forces in Bosnia. He assumed command on 24 January 1994. Before his appointment, Lieutenant

General Rose was Commander, UK Field Army, and had previously served as Commandant of the British Staff College in Camberley, equivalent to the US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. He was responsible for introducing peacekeeping courses at the school and developing the British Army Field Manual on operations other than war, titled Wider Peacekeeping. Rose was a member of the Special Air Service (SAS) and in May 1980 directed operations for B Squadron, 22nd SAS Regiment when they retook the Iranian Embassy at Princes Gate, London, from Arab terrorists. Rose also served with this regiment in the Falkland Islands. Lieutenant General Rose commanded the 39 Infantry Brigade in Northern Ireland, which conducted operations against the Irish Republican Army (IRA). He was Commandant, School of Infantry and later Director, Special Forces. Friends that knew him predicted "You can say one thing for him. After Mike Rose, the UN forces there will never be the same again."⁸

Warring Faction Objectives

By January 1994, the Bosnian Serbs controlled 70 percent of Bosnia Herzegovina and the key terrain surrounding Sarajevo. The confrontation lines between the Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats, and Bosnian Muslims had remained relatively unchanged for twelve months.⁹ The Bosnian Serb leadership felt that the war was over and was willing to negotiate a permanent cease-fire with the Bosnian Muslims. The Bosnian Serb objectives were to eliminate the Muslim enclaves in eastern Bosnia; to expand the Posavina Corridor, the critical strip of land that connected the eastern and western areas of Serb-controlled

territory; and to obtain international recognition as an independent state. The Bosnian Serb leadership viewed the UNPROFOR presence as a useful shield against a potentially hostile NATO or United States. The Bosnian Serb's UN objectives consisted of limiting UNPROFOR's presence in Serb-controlled areas to a bare minimum, restricting humanitarian aid to Muslims and Croats to as little as possible while maximizing the amount of aid for Bosnian Serbs.

In January 1994, the Bosnian Muslim leadership believed that they could gain more by continuing the war than from the negotiating table. As a result, they were unwilling to sign a cessation of hostility or a permanent cease-fire agreement. Either agreement would freeze the confrontations lines, and realistic or not, Bosnian Muslim objectives included regaining all territory lost to the Bosnian Serbs and Croats. Their objectives included drawing the United Nations or NATO into the war on the Bosnian Muslim side, breaking the siege of Sarajevo, eliminating Bosnian Croat resistance in central Bosnia, and lifting the arms embargo that placed them at a serious disadvantage against the heavily armed Bosnian Serbs. The Bosnian Muslim's UN objectives included obtaining as much humanitarian aid as possible, especially for the eastern enclaves (Srebrenica, Zepa, and Gorazde); obtaining as much protection from UNPROFOR's presence as possible; however, restricting the UN presence in areas where Muslim offensives were about to take place.

The Bosnian Croat's objectives in January 1994 were to preserve their enclaves in central Bosnia and to expand and consolidate their holdings in southern Bosnia-Herzegovina in hopes of eventual annexation

by Croatia proper. The Bosnian Croats were amenable to most of the Geneva peace proposals and had agreed to and signed the Vance-Owen Peace Plan. The Bosnian Croat's UN objectives were to obtain as much humanitarian aid as possible for the central Bosnian enclaves, to restrict aid shipments to Muslim enclaves in Bosnian Croat sectors, and to restrict the UN presence in Bosnian Croat areas where the Croatian Army conducted joint offensive operations with the Bosnian Croat Army.

Definitions

Key terms used in this study are: "peacekeeping," "wider peacekeeping," "peace enforcement," "peacemaking," and "safe areas." For purposes of this study, peacekeeping is defined as "operations carried out with the consent of the belligerent parties in support of efforts to achieve or maintain peace in order to promote security and sustain life in areas of potential or actual conflict."¹⁰ The term wider peacekeeping is a British term that has no American equivalent. For purposes of this study it encompasses "the wider aspects of peacekeeping operations carried out with the general consent of the belligerent parties but in an environment that may be highly volatile."¹¹ The British consider observer missions and inter-positioning forces as typical military peacekeeping activities. Wider peacekeeping involves those activities plus conflict prevention, demobilization operations, military assistance, humanitarian relief, and guarantee and denial of movement. Wider peacekeeping is essentially an expanded version of peacekeeping in an environment consisting of numerous parties to a conflict, undisciplined factions,

ineffective ceasefires, absence of law and order, gross violations of human rights, and risk of local armed opposition to UN forces.¹² UNPROFOR operations in Bosnia are an excellent example of wider peacekeeping.

Peace enforcement is a term introduced by UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in An Agenda for Peace.¹³ For purposes of this study, peace enforcement is defined as "operations carried out to restore peace between belligerent parties who do not all consent to intervention and who may be engaged in combat activities."¹⁴ The imperative concept here is that peace enforcement is conducted without consent. The difference between wider peacekeeping and peace enforcement is not the level of violence, but the level of consent of the belligerent parties. American and British definitions agree on this point. The definitions of success for peacekeeping and for peace enforcement are different. Peacekeeping and wider peacekeeping operations are designed

to create or support the conditions in which political and diplomatic activities may proceed. Success will thus be measured by the rate at which the sum total of those activities progresses towards the achievement of the UN mandate. The concept of victory or defeat is therefore inappropriate to peacekeeping operations.¹⁵

For peace enforcement, success is measured by progress to peacekeeping.

In other words:

When peacekeeping fails, the belligerent parties take the blame because they have destroyed their own set of agreements. When peace enforcement fails, the peace operators get the blame and risk casualties. They have failed to control a situation they explicitly sought to control even at high risk.¹⁶

This study will not evaluate B-H Command's 1994 peacekeeping operations in terms of success or failure but will evaluate its effectiveness in achieving its mandated military mission by reviewing the execution of its campaign plan and evaluating its accomplishments.

Peacemaking is another term that Boutros Boutros-Ghali introduced in An Agenda for Peace. He defines peacemaking as an "action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations."¹⁷ This study will use a clearer definition found in Field Manual (FM) 100-23, Peace Operations, which succinctly defines peacemaking as the "process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlement that arranges ends to disputes and resolves issues that led to conflict."¹⁸

UN-designated safe areas were established on 16 April 1993. The United Nations has been deliberately vague in specifically defining what a safe area consists of. The broad definition referring to United Nations Security Council Resolution (SCR) 819 (establishing Srebrenica as the first safe area) and 824 (establishing Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde, Bihac and their surroundings as subsequent safe areas) states that "safe areas were envisaged to be areas free from armed attacks and from any other hostile acts that would endanger the well-being and the safety of their inhabitants and where the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance to the civilian population would be ensured."¹⁹ However, the physical boundaries that defined a safe area were not delineated by the UN. This made it very difficult to determine if a safe area was under attack.

UNPROFOR's Mandate and BHC's Mission in Bosnia

The United Nation's Security Council passed its first resolution on the former Yugoslavia in September 1991 after fierce fighting erupted in July between Croatia and Serbia. United Nations SCR 713 imposed a weapons embargo against all of former Yugoslavia. As the fighting spread throughout Croatia and later to Bosnia, the Security Council responded with a flood of resolutions. Between September 1991 and January 1994, fifty-four Security Council resolutions were passed that dealt with the former Yugoslavia. The Security Council created UNPROFOR on 21 February 1992, to solidify the temporary cease-fire in Croatia. SCR 743 established UNPROFOR and mandated that "the Force should be an interim arrangement to create the conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis."²⁰ When the fighting expanded to Bosnia, the Security Council extended UNPROFOR's mandate, piecemeal, to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Three Security Council resolutions largely defined UNPROFOR's mandate and BHC's mission in Bosnia. SCR 761, passed in June 1992, mandated UNPROFOR to "ensure the security and functioning of Sarajevo Airport and the delivery of humanitarian assistance."²¹ Bosnian Serb forces agreed to relinquish control of Sarajevo Airport to the United Nations for humanitarian aid purposes. BHC forces assumed control of the airport and opened it up for humanitarian aid flights. SCR 776, passed in September 1992, mandated BHC and "military personnel to facilitate the delivery by relevant United Nations humanitarian

organizations and others of humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo and wherever needed in other parts of Bosnia."²² As a result, BHC's mission expanded to escorting and protecting humanitarian aid convoys in Bosnia. SCR 836, passed in June 1993, enlarged UNPROFOR's mandate to

deter attacks against the safe areas, to monitor the cease-fire, to promote the withdrawal of military or paramilitary units other than those of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and to occupy some key points on the ground, in addition to participating in the delivery of humanitarian relief to the population.²³

In military terms, BHC's mission was to secure the six safe areas in Bosnia. The word "secure" has a precise meaning in the operational context, unlike the ambiguous wording of Security Council resolutions. It means "to gain possession of a position or terrain feature, with or without force, and to make such disposition as will prevent, as far as possible, its destruction or loss by enemy action."²⁴ By January 1994, BHC had a threefold mission: secure and operate Sarajevo Airport, escort and protect humanitarian aid convoys, and secure safe areas.

A Campaign Plan For Bosnia

UNPROFOR's ever-shifting mandate in Bosnia presented a moving target for its military planners. The changing mandate resulted in ad hoc planning and uncoordinated execution of peacekeeping operations. A major military operation, especially one the size and complexity of UNPROFOR, requires a campaign plan to translate political end states into military goals and objectives. UN resolutions are murky documents at best and usually fail to contain the precise tactical language military planners require to conduct military operations. Security

Council resolutions, by nature, contain obfuscating language, reflecting the necessary compromises needed for passage. This deliberate lack of clarity can confuse peacekeepers unless the mandate is translated into an executable mission with military objectives, constraints, restraints, and guidance. The campaign plan is the best means of achieving this objective.

The U.S. Military has recognized the benefits of campaign planning in theater operations and includes this course of instruction in its senior service colleges. As a former Commandant of the British Staff College in Camberly, General Rose called on members of the staff there to construct a campaign plan for Bosnia. The staff divided UNPROFOR's theater of operations into strategic, operational and tactical levels. The UN Headquarters in New York comprised the strategic level of command for the theater; the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) at UNPROFOR Headquarters in Zagreb was at the operational level; and Croatia, Macedonia, and B-H Command operated at the tactical level. Under British Wider Peacekeeping doctrine, operational-level planning begins with the Special Representative of the Secretary General translating

the Security Council mandate into a "campaign" plan with an unambiguous concept of operations and a clearly defined end state. The "campaign" plan should allocate resources, specify military, diplomatic and humanitarian missions and establish their linkage and coordination.²⁵

Shortly after his arrival in theater, General Rose submitted the campaign plan to SRSG Akashi for approval and used the document as his blueprint for operations in Bosnia.

A Campaign Plan for Bosnia Herzegovina defined the desired end state of UNPROFOR operations as "peace, security and creating the conditions for economic renewal for all the peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BH) [prior to the withdrawal of UN military forces]." The campaign plan established strategic goals to achieve the desired end state. These goals were to contain the conflict within the former Yugoslavia, ameliorate adverse humanitarian consequences, create conditions for a lasting peace agreement through negotiation, and assist the population in reconstruction, economic renewal, and peaceful coexistence. Chapter four of this study examines, in detail, BHC's plan to accomplish its mandated mission and the strategic goals necessary to achieve UNPROFOR's desired end state.

Conclusion

By January 1994, UNPROFOR's mandate had been subjected to over two years of incremental mission expansion. The original mandate for a peacekeeping force in Croatia had been expanded to include different missions in Bosnia and Macedonia. Unfortunately, the troop levels and resources called for by UNPROFOR commanders were more often than not ignored. None of the three previous B-H Commanders had served a full tour in command. BHC's mission of providing military assistance to UNHCR humanitarian operations was continually obstructed for political or military purposes by all warring factions. Aid workers and peacekeepers were killed, convoy operations were suspended a number of times, and the international airlift to Sarajevo had been interrupted on numerous occasions due to security reasons. UNPROFOR troop-

contributing nations threatened to withdraw their personnel by the spring of 1994 if the situation did not dramatically improve. UNPROFOR units in Bosnia needed a different plan for the coming year. BHC's campaign plan offered the prospect of progress for UN peacekeepers.

¹Lieutenant General Francis Briquemont, farewell speech at the Sarajevo Residency, 23 January 1994.

²All UN Resolutions cited in this study are from The United Nations Department of Public Information, The United Nations and the Situation in the Former Yugoslavia, 23 January 1995.

³Major General Lewis MacKenzie, Peacekeeper: The Road to Sarajevo (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 1993), 291.

⁴United Nations, UNPROFOR Mission Statement (Bosnia-Herzegovina: HQ B-H Command, January 1994) 1.

⁵The United Nations Department of Public Information, The United Nations and the Situation in the Former Yugoslavia, 23 January 1995, 16.

⁶Andrew Hogg, "Can this man answer Bosnia's prayers?" The Sunday Times, 9 January 1994, 9.

⁷UNPROFOR Press and Public Information Office, Biography of Lieutenant General Sir Michael Rose.

⁸"Who dares can win the peace," The Observer, 9 January 1994, 19.

⁹United Nations, UNPROFOR Staff Assessment, Confrontation Lines, 1 January 1994. The Warring Factions Objectives section of this is based on the staff assessment. The staff assessment is a synthesis from a variety of sources, (United Nations Military Observers, European Community Mission Monitors) distributed as an aims and intentions assessment for B-H Command Staff.

¹⁰UK Army Field Manual, Wider Peacekeeping, (London: Ministry of Defense, 1995) 2-5.

¹¹Wider Peacekeeping, 2-5.

¹²Wider Peacekeeping, 1-7.

¹³Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Agenda for Peace, (New York: United Nations, 1992), 26.

¹⁴Wider Peacekeeping, 2-5.

¹⁵Wider Peacekeeping, 1-8.

¹⁶David S. Alberts and Richard Hayes, Command Arrangements for Peace Operations, (Institute for National Strategic Studies: National Defense University Press, 1995), 74.

¹⁷Agenda for Peace, 11.

¹⁸U.S. Army, FM 100-23, Peace Operations (Washington , D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994), 112.

¹⁹UN Secretariat, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Resolution 844 (1993), U.N. Doc. 94-20985 (E) (New York: United Nations, 9 May 1994) 15.

²⁰The UN Department of Public Information, The United Nations and the Situation in the Former Yugoslavia, (New York: UN, 23 January 1995), 78.

²¹*Ibid.*, 90.

²²*Ibid.*, 99.

²³*Ibid.*, 136.

²⁴US DOD, Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989), 327.

²⁵Wider Peacekeeping, 6-1.

CHAPTER TWO

A YEAR IN REVIEW

Well that was easy, what are we going to do for the remaining eleven months?¹

Lieutenant General Rose

This chapter explains General Rose's initial strategy and BHC's campaign plan to accomplish UNPROFOR's mission in Bosnia. General Rose had traveled throughout the region in December 1993, before it was announced that he would be assuming command, and consequently arrived in Sarajevo at the end of January 1994 with a plan of action. He was determined to reorganize BHC and focus it on the delivery of humanitarian aid which he hoped to accomplish through a more robust military approach. He also intended to reverse what he felt was a global perception of failure of UN operations in Bosnia by winning the information war. This chapter will also review the three crises that defined his tenure, the Bosnian Serb sieges of Sarajevo, Gorazde and Bihac as well as the implementation of the Muslim-Croat cease-fire.

The Situation

The winter of 1993-1994 had been mild in Sarajevo. An early snow had fallen on the mountain ranges surrounding the capital, but by the last week of January, the city was bare. High above, on the slopes of Mt. Trebevic and Trnovo, Bosnian Serb units from the Romanija Corps

stood huddled around their artillery pieces and suspiciously observed a gathering of United Nations troops at the Sarajevo Airport. Below them on the tarmac, Lieutenant General Michael Rose assumed command of UNPROFOR's Bosnia contingent from Lieutenant General Francis Briquemont. After the ceremony, the Belgian contingent silently boarded a US C-130 which immediately departed for Brussels. Even as the change of command was taking place, carpenters and electricians were working on the second floor of the Sarajevo Residency, expanding the huge dining room where General Rose's communications center would be. Tarpaulins and canvas drop cloths were hung about to keep down the dust. Troops from the British signal detachment supervised the movement of telephone outlets and rubber-insulated fiber cables that would enable the forward headquarters of BHC to communicate with the outside world. The Belgian contingent had packed up their equipment and satellite link, stripping the forward command center. The Residency, which had adopted a French flavor from its past two commanders, was about to become distinctly British.

Up until 1994, UNPROFOR's B-H commanders operated a small (fifty personnel) forward headquarters in Sarajevo (at the Residency), twenty-four kilometers from the main headquarters in the Bosnian Croat-controlled village of Kiseljak. This allowed the commander to consult with the Bosnian political leadership located downtown in the Presidency building and the Bosnian Serb leadership in the nearby ski resort of Pale. As a result, most of the day-to-day operational control of BHC forces rested with the chief of staff (CoS) British Brigadier Angus Ramsay at Kiseljak. BHC consisted of Sector Sarajevo,

commanded by French Brigadier General Soubirou, and consisted of four mechanized infantry battalions and approximately eight additional battalions plus transport, engineer, and supply elements located throughout Bosnia.² With the exception of Sector Sarajevo, all battalion-sized units and below were controlled directly by the division-level staff of BHC at Kiseljak. The mountainous terrain in Bosnia made communications difficult, and national governments often limited their contingents operations their respective Areas of Responsibility (AORs). If the B-H commander wished to relocate a unit in Bosnia, he would have to engage in complicated negotiations with the sending government.

The chain of command upwards from BHC was greatly simplified by the time Lieutenant General Rose arrived in Bosnia. Although UN civil affairs advisors were assigned to BHC, they were UN civil servants and were not authorized to conclude negotiations with the warring factions or to speak on the UN Secretary General's behalf. As UNPROFOR operations became more military in nature, the absence of an authorized UNPROFOR decision maker in the region became a severe hindrance. All major decisions had to be referred back to UN headquarters in New York. This slowed down UNPROFOR's decision-making process. After NATO agreed to provide close air support (CAS) to UNPROFOR in August 1993, the UNPROFOR Force Commander engaged in a running dispute with the Secretary General over control of NATO close air support missions. French General Jean Cot strongly believed that he should have authorization for CAS in order to provide timely support to his field commands.³ He engaged in a bitter argument with the Secretary General

over this issue. As a result, General Cot was replaced by French General Bertrand de Lapresle as Force Commander, and a Special Representative to the Secretary General (SRSG) was sent to Zagreb and put in charge of UNPROFOR operations. The UN Secretary General delegated decision-making authorization to the SRSG, to include requesting CAS from NATO. On 3 January 1994, Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali appointed Mr. Yasushi Akashi as his Special Representative for the former Yugoslavia. The streamlining of command and control improved UNPROFOR's decision-making process and allowed the UN to operate proactively.

Public relations efforts by UNPROFOR and BHC were largely ineffective due to UN sensitivities to anything that could be construed as propaganda. The Bosnian Muslims, Serbs, and Croats tightly controlled the newspapers, television, and radio stations in their areas.⁴ This played a large role in preventing BHC from winning the hearts and minds of the local populace. The Public Information Office at BHC consisted of five inexperienced military personnel and one civilian public relations representative. Their primary responsibilities were to host the daily press conference at Sector Sarajevo Headquarters located in the city's former Post, Telephone, and Telegraph (PTT) building and to help support, organize, and publicize Sarajevo's music and art events.

The Plan

General Rose arrived in Sarajevo determined to reorganize and relocate his command, prepared to implement a coordinated strategy

between the UNHCR and UNPROFOR, intent on constructing an effective public information campaign, and ardent to instill a warrior spirit within UNPROFOR units. These were all components of his campaign plan. General Rose's initial strategy consisted of five lines of action. He intended to change the focus and structure of BHC, win the information war, develop cooperation between the UN and the warring factions by rewarding compliance and punishing obstruction, achieve freedom of movement, and enhance humanitarian assistance. He made no secret of these plans and took immediate measures to reduce the size of BHC Headquarters by over 30 percent and to relocate them from peaceful Kiseljak to Sarajevo. He strongly believed that the commander and his headquarters needed to be collocated at the conflict's perceived center of gravity, Sarajevo. One of his first actions as B-H Commander was to visit his headquarters in Kiseljak and inform the staff that he believed they were too large, did not need to be commanding battalions at their level, and would be relocating with him in Sarajevo. He envisioned the creation of two brigade commands out of existing assets, to command and control battalions located in a northeast and southwest sector of Bosnia (see Figure 1). These changes were published five days after his arrival in Bosnia in his confirmatory orders to his troops.⁵ The reorganization took effect by 1 March 1994, no mean feat considering the United Nations bureaucratic machinery. This reorganization later allowed BHC to take full advantage of local UN commanders' initiatives when the Muslim-Croat cease-fire was announced.

In addition to reorganizing BHC, General Rose focused its efforts on the delivery of humanitarian aid in Bosnia. He directed

that all activity in BHC must reflect this priority and that there must be no dispersal of effort. To that end, Rose stated that BHC would seize the initiative from the warring parties and cease to be manipulated for their ends. He would achieve this by encouraging his forces to take a more robust approach to exercising the UN mandate in Bosnia. Rose directed that when shot at, units must reply. BHC peacekeepers would "insist on the right to freedom of movement, backed by a right to riposte by all means."⁶ He clearly stated that the capture and detention of UN vehicles, equipment, and personnel was unacceptable and that it was the duty of each soldier to resist by adopting a more military approach to operations. This guidance was dramatically different in spirit from previous commanders, which emphasized obeying the warring factions forces at checkpoints and roadblocks when escorting humanitarian aid. General Rose's command guidance was skeptically received by many of the peacekeepers who were serving under their third B-H Commander in less than a year. Many of them muttered that they had heard this kind of talk before.

General Rose was serious about the use of force to get humanitarian aid through to its destination. He was by no means advocating the initiation of a shooting war between UNPROFOR and the warring factions. Instead, he was a strong proponent of the judicious use of military force to achieve limited objectives, in this case forcing humanitarian aid convoys through roadblocks to exercise the UN's freedom of movement mandate.

In order to seize the initiative from the warring factions, BHC began to selectively escort humanitarian aid convoys with heavily armed

tracked vehicles. The intent was to create a situation at the UN's time and place of choosing. All of the warring factions had a standing policy of not allowing any UN convoy to pass through its checkpoints if it was accompanied by heavily armed escorts. The warring faction's rationale was that these UNPROFOR escorts were "offensive weapons" and consequently not covered by the freedom of movement agreement with UNPROFOR. The actual reason was that they had no desire to grant the UN unrestricted freedom of movement and intended to continue to stop UN convoys.

Within a week of General Rose's arrival, BHC made arrangements to use force to pass through a Bosnian Serb roadblock that prevented UN convoys in Sarajevo from reaching UNPROFOR Headquarters in Kiseljak. BHC was taking the first steps toward establishing a coherent strategy that linked political, military and aid agency objectives. It seized the initiative from the warring parties by intentionally sending a heavily armed convoy through a checkpoint, fully prepared to have it blocked. Only, in this case, BHC had ordered a heavily-armored British platoon from Vitez to move to Kiseljak to serve as a quick-reaction force to physically force the convoy through and reestablish the principle of UN freedom of movement. This was in line with BHC's new robust approach to exercising the UN mandate. BHC peacekeepers were ordered to return fire if they were fired at, and BHC was prepared to employ close air support in this situation.

On 3 February 1994, after Canadian and Danish armored vehicles had been denied passage through a Bosnian Serb checkpoint known as Sierra One, Bosnian Serb checkpoint guards were notified that they were

in direct violation of the 18 November Freedom of Movement Agreement that Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic had signed and that UN escorts would use force to pass.⁷ After a tense confrontation at the checkpoint, senior Bosnian Serb authorities telephonically ordered the checkpoint to allow all UN vehicles through. This was a tremendous boost to UNPROFOR's morale. Just about every peacekeeper in Bosnia had suffered the indignity of waiting for hours or days at Sierra One, enroute to BHC headquarters.

UNPROFOR's success at Sierra One was worldwide news. This was largely due to a higher profile that General Rose exhibited to the press than his predecessors had. He had stated from the day he arrived that the UN was losing the information war in Bosnia. He felt that the work of some journalists was detrimental to UNPROFOR and led to a global perception of failure. BHC's solution was twofold: it would get experienced media handlers posted on its staff and would use the media to promote UNPROFOR's mission.⁸ General Rose intended to integrate the media into BHC's campaign plan by taking them along with him during UN operations to present UNPROFOR's point of view to the general public. There was a tremendous media blitz when General Rose arrived in Sarajevo and BHC did its best to accommodate everyone. General Rose usually conducted two media interviews a day during his first two weeks in the country to accommodate the international audience and frequently visited the Sarajevo radio and television networks to convey his message to the local populace. Unlike his predecessors, he was also extremely visible to the citizens of Sarajevo. He attended church services downtown and mingled with the

general public, something very few UN personnel did due to heavy sniper and artillery fire.

The Sarajevo Crisis

On 4 February 1994, three mortar shells struck a community center in Dobrinja, the former Olympic village of Sarajevo. A total of ten civilians and children were killed and eighteen were wounded as they waited in line for food. This incident received the normal level of media coverage but caused an abnormal amount of speculation that NATO might intervene for the first time in its history with airstrikes. The BSA normally make no comment and rarely acknowledge the daily Sarajevo shelling incidents. In an unusual move, the BSA announced that the community center was not an authorized target, and furthermore while not acknowledging that they had fired the shells, they did state that their higher headquarters had not authorized shelling in that area. The UNPROFOR French battalion conducted a crater analysis to determine the origin of the shelling and conclusively determined that the BSA was responsible for this attack. The next day this attack was overshadowed by the Mercale Market massacre.

On Saturday, 5 February 1994, a 120 millimeter mortar shell struck the Sarajevo Mercale outdoor market place at 1215 hours.⁹ The downtown market square was full of shoppers and 63 people were killed and 198 wounded. The market place is surrounded by high buildings, and it appeared the shell had deflected off of a building and a market table, airbursting prior to impact on the market square. This resulted in an inordinate amount of casualties and a skewed impact crater.

Three separate crater analyses were conducted to determine who had fired the shell. Each investigation came up with inconclusive results. Television crews were in the area when the shell exploded and gruesome televised images of the massacre filled the airwaves and shocked audiences around the world. President Clinton immediately authorized the use of US assets to evacuate wounded victims of the attack to Landstuhl, Germany for treatment. Meanwhile, UNPROFOR saw an opportunity for a breakthrough.

SRSB Akashi flew into Sarajevo on 6 February, after the impact of the attack on world opinion became clear. He hoped to use the mortar attack, which had riveted world attention on Sarajevo, as an impetus to the peace process. His initial attempt to achieve a cease-fire agreement between the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Serbs was rebuffed. Bosnian President Izetbegovic and Prime Minister Silajdzic agreed to sign an agreement only if the Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) artillery was moved out of range of Sarajevo and placed under UNPROFOR control. Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic, accompanied by General Gvero at Lukavica barracks in Serb-controlled Sarajevo, refused to withdraw his forces or have his heavy weapons placed under UNPROFOR control. The Bosnian Serbs did agree to accept "on-site monitoring" by UNPROFOR of BSA heavy weapons. Meanwhile, UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali sent a message to NATO Secretary General Wornat requesting UN authority to call for offensive NATO airstrikes.¹⁰ Previous arrangements between the UN and NATO were strictly for defensive close air support in the event UNPROFOR lives were endangered. The UN was now requesting the capability to conduct offensive operations.

At 2030 hours on 7 February, Lieutenant General Rose met with Bosnian Army (BiH) General Jovan Divjak at his headquarters in Sarajevo.¹¹ General Divjak speaking for the BiH and Bosnian Government agreed to the following principles: a cease-fire, the subsequent interpositioning of UNPROFOR forces along Sarajevo confrontation lines, on-site monitoring of all BiH heavy weapon systems in Sarajevo, and a meeting with BSA representatives at 1200 hours, 9 February. General Divjak also agreed that Sarajevo would become a UN administered city for a minimum period of two years. The meeting ended late, and General Rose did not have the opportunity to discuss this breakthrough with SRSG Akashi until the following morning, 8 February, when he accompanied Akashi back to Zagreb. General Rose believed he could get an agreement between the two factions for a Sarajevo cease-fire. He also sought and obtained permission from the SRSG to force open a Bosnian Croat roadblock that was obstructing passage in Central Bosnia.

Rose returned from Zagreb on 8 February and immediately met with BSA Chief of Staff General Milovanovic at Lukavica Barracks at 1600 hours. General Milovanovic had full authority from Mr. Karadzic and General Mladic to agree to the principles of a cease-fire, withdrawal of heavy weapons, and a meeting with the BiH at 1200 hours, 9 February at the Sarajevo Airport. General Milovanovic confirmed that these principles would be taken with a view to placing Sarajevo under UN administration. Meanwhile, the North Atlantic Council was conducting an emergency meeting at its headquarters in Brussels to determine what actions NATO would take against indiscriminate attacks against Sarajevo.

On 9 February, after a great deal of arm twisting by General Rose to get the Bosnian Muslim representatives to attend the agreed-upon airport meeting, the Sarajevo cease-fire agreement was concluded.¹² The four-component agreement, which later became known as the Sarajevo Formula, consisted of an immediate cease-fire, interpositioning of UN forces between the warring factions, withdrawal of all heavy weapons (anything larger than 12.7 millimeter), and the establishment of a Joint Military Commission chaired by UNPROFOR to work out the details of the interpositioning of forces and withdrawal of heavy weapons. Significantly this was a verbal agreement, and a press conference was held immediately afterwards to announce the agreed-upon four points. General Rose did not ask either party to sign the agreement, remarking that signatures had little value on Bosnian cease-fire agreements. Instead, he stated that actions, not signatures on a document, would indicate compliance.¹³ NATO announced later in the evening that in response to the UN Secretary General's 6 February request for offensive NATO air strikes, NATO would conduct air raids against Bosnian Serb artillery or heavy weapons involved in the siege of Sarajevo unless they were either withdrawn outside of a 20 kilometer total exclusion zone or placed under UN control. The Bosnian Serbs had ten days to comply with the terms set forth in the NATO ultimatum or suffer the consequences.

Within hours of the cease-fire agreement, General Rose ordered his Sector Sarajevo Commander French General Soubirou to plan the interpositioning of UNPROFOR between the two factions along the confrontation line and to send out advance parties as early as 1000

hours the following day, 10 February. This, despite the fact that the Joint Military Commission, consisting of Bosnian Serbs and Muslims tasked to work out the details of the deployment, was not scheduled to meet until 0900, 10 February. When BHC staff members mentioned the time discrepancy, the general merely smiled and stated the motto of the Special Air Service, "Who dares, wins." Rose had momentum on his side and intended to keep both warring factions off balance by moving quickly and aggressively. Later that evening, on 9 February, after conducting a CNN interview, he invited the world press corps encamped in Sarajevo to accompany his peacekeepers when they deployed from the PTT building (Sector Sarajevo Headquarters) to interposition themselves along the confrontation line. General Rose believed that the presence of television cameras along the confrontation line would serve as a deterrent to any cease-fire violations, especially since the leaders of both factions had sworn to adhere to the agreement before the world media at the airport press conference.

On 10 February at 1000 hours, heavily armed UNPROFOR platoons, escorted by UN Military Observers (UNMOs), moved into flashpoints along the confrontation line and assumed monitoring positions while the first meeting of the Joint Military Commission was still taking place at the airport. UNMOs serve as the unarmed eyes and ears of UNPROFOR. There were 77 UNMOs in Sarajevo in both Bosnian Serb and Muslim areas of control. Their duties were to monitor the cease-fire agreement, patrol both sides of the conflict area, and help resolve local difficulties by liaising with all sides of the conflict. General Rose also made liberal use of SAS-trained UNPROFOR members to serve as heavily armed

eyes and ears for him. Still there was a severe shortage of personnel to execute the cease-fire mission. One hundred and ten UNMO augmentees were enroute from Croatia and other sectors of the former Yugoslavia to help preserve the fragile agreement. General Rose did not have enough peacekeepers and UNMOs to interpose along the forty-mile Sarajevo confrontation line and concomitantly escort humanitarian aid convoys. The UN requested troop contributing nations to send an additional 3,000 troops to help consolidate the Sarajevo cease-fire and possibly extend it, but after a great deal of discussion, most countries were reluctant to send reinforcements.¹⁴

In the days leading up to the 21 February 1994 deadline, several key events occurred. A massive snow storm struck the Sarajevo region making roads impassable and stranding Bosnian Serb artillery batteries in their mountain locations within the 20 kilometer total exclusion zone. After coordination with UNPROFOR and NATO, many of these artillery sites were designated as weapon collection points and placed under UN control. On 17 February, Russian special envoy Vitaly Churkin delivered a letter from Russian President Boris Yeltsin to Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic, which requested the withdrawal of heavy weapons from Sarajevo in exchange for the presence of 400 Russian peacekeepers to help monitor the cease-fire.¹⁵ Karadzic accepted the face saving offer, and by 21 February 1994, the UN and NATO announced they were satisfied with Bosnian Serb compliance and the ultimatum deadline expired without event. Four hundred Russian blue-bereted paratroopers had convoyed through Pale and entered Sarajevo hours before the 21 February 1994 NATO ultimatum expired and assumed

positions in the Bosnian Serb-held district of Grbavica to serve as a buffer force. British and French detachments arrived in Sarajevo with Cymbeline counterbattery radar to help monitor the agreement by providing "smoking gun evidence" that a particular party was responsible for a cease-fire violation.

To stabilize the Sarajevo cease-fire, BHC ordered the initiation of Phase Two of its campaign plan to transition the region from war to peace. Phase One was the immediate implementation of a cease-fire, the interpositioning of UN forces between the warring factions, withdrawal of heavy weapons, and the establishment of a UNPROFOR-chaired Joint Commission.¹⁶ Phase Two was the normalization of the city through restoration of utilities, services, and access routes. The limited Sarajevo water service, which had been installed by the International Rescue Committee under the sponsorship of the Soros Foundation, was expanded via water trucks to provide supplies to additional neighborhoods. Gas, which was essential for heating and cooking, was restored by repairing pipelines and reopening Bosnian Serb-controlled valves. Electricity service resumed after repairs were conducted, and public transportation resumed after the electrically powered trams began running again. Rubbish disposal was coordinated, telephone lines were restored, and routes around and out of the city were opened. The policy of "peace by piece" appeared successful.

The Muslim-Croat Cease-fire

On 23 February, two days after the expiration of NATO's Sarajevo ultimatum, Bosnian Government and Bosnian Croat forces signed

a cease-fire agreement to be implemented on 25 February. This shocking breakthrough was announced on the heels of the Sarajevo cease-fire and made it appear that peace was "breaking out" throughout the Balkans. This cease-fire, which resulted in the Muslim-Croat Federation, was implemented by UNPROFOR and placed a severe strain on BHC resources, which were already overstretched enforcing the Sarajevo cease-fire.

Bosnian Croats are the faceless faction of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. They control the southern sector of Bosnia-Herzegovina known as Herzegovina. Bosnian Croats are also located in isolated pockets in Central Bosnia at Vitez, Kiseljak, Vares and Zepce-- all surrounded by Bosnian Muslims. Bosnian Croats and Muslims initially fought together against the Bosnian Serbs in a formal alliance agreed to in July 1992 between Presidents Tudjman and Izetbegovic. It soon became apparent that the two factions had different goals in mind. The Muslims were fighting to restore their internationally recognized borders, whereas the Bosnian Croats were fighting for ethnic partition and a racially pure Croatian state.¹⁶ Fighting initially broke out between Muslims and Bosnian Croats in October 1992 near Travnik, after Bosnian Croats established a Croatian ministate, Herceg-Bosna, which they intended to annex with Croatia. As fighting between the two factions swept through Herzegovina, Bosnian Croats proceeded to ally themselves with the Bosnian Serbs. In November 1992, Bosnian Serbs and Croats agreed to join their territories politically and to create a joint army and legal system. Bosnian Croat forces, known as the Hrvatsko Vijece Odbran (HVO) which is Croatian for Croatian Defense Council, attempted to make Mostar the capital of their breakaway

country.¹⁹ Bosnian Croats were led by hard-liner Mate Boban, a protege of Croatian President Tudjman. Boban demanded that the Bosnian Muslim Army in Mostar disarm and come under direct control of the HVO. The Muslims refused to disarm in Mostar, and this ignited a war between the Croats and Muslims throughout Bosnia.

In October 1993, US special envoy Charles E. Redman encouraged the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croats to end the conflict that neither could expect to win and create a federation of two states. The US pressed Croatian President Tudjman to withdraw Croatian Army troops from Bosnia by threatening to impose the same kind of trade embargo imposed on Serbia for supporting the Bosnian Serbs. US Ambassador to Croatia, Peter Galbraith, encouraged Tudjman to replace Bosnian Croat leader Boban for blocking all peace initiatives, stopping aid convoys through Bosnian Croat territory and controlling concentration camps filled with Muslim civilians.²⁰ Tudjman announced on 12 January 1994 that Bosnian Croat leader Boban would no longer attend any peace negotiations. On 8 February 1994, Boban announced his resignation and was replaced by a collective presidency which elected Bosnian Croat Justice Minister Kresimir Zubak, a moderate, to head the emergency presidential council.

On 19 February, in the middle of the Sarajevo crisis, Croatian Foreign Minister Granic and Bosnian Prime Minister Silajdzic met in Frankfurt to discuss a possible Croat-Muslim Federation in Bosnia and its eventual confederation with Croatia. They made little progress but agreed to continue discussions in Zagreb. On 23 February, the Bosnian Government and Bosnian Croat forces signed a cease-fire agreement at

Camp Pleso, outside of Zagreb. The agreement called for a cease-fire by 25 February and was configured in accordance with the Sarajevo formula. There would be a cease-fire, interpositioning of UNPROFOR forces, removal and turn-in of heavy weapons, and the establishment of a Joint Commission headed by UNPROFOR. Although BHC did not play a direct role in forming the Croat-Muslim Federation, General Rose helped outline the final form of the cease-fire agreement and witnessed the signing ceremony.²¹

On 1 March, Bosnian Prime Minister Silajdzic, Croatian Foreign Minister Granic, and Bosnian Croat leader Zubak signed a framework agreement in Washington to establish a Croat-Muslim Federation. The framework was finalized on 12 March and finally signed by Presidents Izetbegovic, Tudjman and Zubak in Washington on 18 March. Meanwhile, a severely overstretched UNPROFOR was implementing the agreement. Under the leadership of British Brigadier Reith, commanding the newly formed BHC Sector Southwest, the Muslim-Croat cease-fire agreement was expertly executed. UNPROFOR forces monitored the confrontation lines between Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat forces, supervised the turn-in of small arms and crew-served weapons and guarded heavy weapon collection points. Both Muslim and Bosnian Croat forces maintained a permanent presence at the Sector Southwest Operations Cell to discuss differences and resolve problems throughout the operation. The hardest test for the agreement was Mostar. Although General Rose stated he was "sure that the Sarajevo model is in tactical terms very transferable to Mostar," he needed to keep the momentum going "so that the peace process can spread like wildfire."²² By 7 March 1994, Bosnian

Croats and Muslims had met the agreed upon deadline for turning in weapons and the cease-fire had stabilized. UNPROFOR began the process of restoring normalcy to Mostar, Vitez, and other regions that suffered from heavy Muslim-Croat fighting. BHC soon shifted to Phase Two operations, as they had in Sarajevo, by restoring utilities, disposing of trash, and clearing the roads, as well as rebuilding schools and essential infrastructure in the region. It truly appeared that peace was at hand in Bosnia until the specter of Gorazde began to slow the momentum for peace.

The Gorazde Crisis

Gorazde is a Muslim occupied pocket approximately forty miles southeast of Sarajevo and about eight miles from Serbia's border. In April 1994, the pocket extended twelve miles from east to west and approximately ten miles north to south over extremely mountainous and wooded terrain. Prior to the war, Gorazde had a mixed population of approximately two-thirds Muslim and one-third Serb. It was a modern industrial town that lay along the spectacular Drina River Valley. Gorazde is surrounded by towering mountains and virgin forests. Two major highways pass through Gorazde, running from the north to the south, along each bank of the Drina River that bisects the town. The Pobjeda ammunition factory lies along the northern limit of the town, which is defended by the 2nd Brigade, 1st Corps of the Bosnian Muslim Army. Gorazde remained a pocket of resistance in the midst of Bosnian Serb territory because of its highly defensible terrain. It was designated one of six Bosnian Safe Areas in June 1993, and remained

under siege by Bosnian Serb forces, cut off from humanitarian aid convoys. During the winter months, US C-130s dropped food and medical supplies into the enclave to help keep the 65,000 trapped inhabitants alive.

By the end of March 1994, BHC was hoping to consolidate the gains achieved through the Sarajevo cease-fire and the Muslim-Croat cease-fire. BHC peacekeepers were dangerously overstretched along the hundreds of miles of confrontation lines that they were monitoring. Plans to rebuild the infrastructure of Sarajevo, as well as that of Mostar, were well underway. It was apparent that UNPROFOR needed more peacekeepers to get the job done. It was relying on peacekeepers that had been temporarily transferred from Croatia Command to man monitoring posts and guard heavy weapon collection points in Bosnia. By early April, General Rose was considering a tour to America in hopes of convincing the United States to send troops to Bosnia.²³ He was also in the midst of negotiating a two-week country-wide cease-fire between the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Muslims.

The successful resolution of the Sarajevo crisis convinced the Bosnian government that US military support was just a question of time. This made them reluctant to agree to a comprehensive cease-fire with the Bosnian Serbs, because that had the potential to freeze the Bosnian Serb's territorial gains. General Rose's message to both factions was "you've reached the culmination point: politically, economically and militarily you can't go anywhere."²⁴ When questioned about the prospects for a comprehensive cease-fire, General Rose stated "hopefully, we'll get them to agree to a draft agreement and then we'll

take them to the airport to get the signature. I then take on a thousand more kilometers of confrontation line I haven't got the troops to patrol."²⁵ A breakthrough was the "result of much work," he said. "Basically, you get an offer or you think the conditions are right and you make a proposal one side accepts. Then you go to the other and say can we have a meeting. Sometimes the meeting is accepted, sometimes not."²⁶

As UNPROFOR continued to monitor confrontation lines around Sarajevo and along the Muslim-Croat sectors, fighting continued between the Bosnian Serbs and Muslims along the Posavina Corridor, within the Bihac Pocket, at Doboj and over control of the road network at Olovo. Sporadic fighting also occurred within the three eastern enclaves of Srebrenica, Zepa and Gorazde whenever BiH raiding parties conducted probes against the BSA. These raiding parties were usually forced to retreat under heavy BSA artillery fire. All of these areas controlled key road networks and were frequent sites of fighting throughout the conflict. Even with all of the fighting, the confrontation lines had remained fairly static over the past two years. Aside from Sarajevo, there was very little media coverage of the fighting taking place in Bosnia due to the tight restrictions both factions placed on traveling.

The Bosnian Serbs began to shell Gorazde heavily during the last week of March 1994. BHC assessed that the shelling was not a major BSA offensive, but strictly a retaliatory action for Muslim raids against Bosnian Serb towns around the Gorazde safe area. General Rose admitted that he underestimated the scale of the Bosnian Serb offensive against the safe area. He remarked "of course one is never always

right. When I made the assessment I did so based on a number of reports. Ten days later it may prove that they were not altogether accurate."²⁷

On 30 March 1994, US Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gerneral John Shalikashvili, and US United Nations Ambassador Madeleine Albright arrived in Sarajevo for a first-hand view of the progress achieved through the Sarajevo cease-fire. This visit greatly bolstered the Bosnian Government's perception that American military support was just around the corner. The Bosnian Government hardened its negotiating positions for a peace settlement and began to express public alarm at the shelling of Gorazde. Bosnian officials were hopeful that this activity against a UN Safe Area would lead to a replay of the recent Sarajevo scenario. As the Bosnian Serb attacks against Gorazde increased during the first week of April, both US Secretary of Defense William Perry and General Shalikashvili publicly stated that airstrikes were not the solution for Gorazde.²⁸

On 6 April, Bosnian Serb forces breached Muslim defensive lines and closed to within three miles of Gorazde. General Rose, dissatisfied with the quantity and quality of reporting from the enclave, attempted to visit the town on 7 April to personally assess the situation. He was not permitted to enter the enclave, but members of his traveling party, three UNMOs and eight special liaison officers (ostensibly SAS troops qualified and equipped to call in and direct air strikes) were allowed to enter the safe area.²⁹ On 8 and 9 April, General Rose conducted shuttle diplomacy between Bosnian Serb Commander

Mladic and Bosnian Commander Delic to achieve a cease-fire in Gorazde. His attempts failed and artillery attacks against the town intensified.

On 10 April, with BSA forces poised to capture the eastern bank of the Drina River in Gorazde, UNMOs requested close air support and General Rose relayed the request to SRSG Akashi who quickly approved it. NATO aircraft, in their first ground attack in the history of the alliance, bombed a Bosnian Serb command tent. Bosnian Serb Chief of Staff Milovanovic immediately sent a letter to General Rose promising a cessation to the offensive. When the attack continued on the following day, UNMOs once again requested that General Rose call in another airstrike, this time against some armored personnel carriers. General Rose was on the telephone throughout the day with Bosnian Serb Commander Mladic, but the indiscriminate shelling of the safe area continued. The airstrikes were conducted in a limited fashion to deter the Serbs from continuing their offensive and in accordance with peacekeeping rules for the use of force. A minimum level of force was used to achieve a specific aim. The force applied was relevant, timely and proportional and in accordance with peacekeeping rules, only administered after a warning. Newspapers recorded the dialogue between General Rose and General Mladic prior to the launching of the second airstrike:

Mladic: One more attack and I will shoot down aircraft. I can't guarantee UN safety and will attack your headquarters.

Rose: Stop tank and artillery fire into town. If not, we'll have no option but to attack.

Mladic: I'm not attacking. Stop your attack and we'll stop.

Rose: Listen, you asshole, you have your warning.

Mladic: My forces are not attacking.

Rose: You have 10 minutes.³⁰

As a result of the airstrikes, the BSA placed all UNMOs and UN personnel in Bosnian Serb territory under house arrest and blocked the flow of all humanitarian assistance through areas of their control. They also continued the offensive against Gorazde. On 15 April 1994, after two SAS men were wounded, one fatally, General Rose requested close air support once again, to evacuate his men from the enclave. SRSg Akashi was conducting cease-fire negotiations with Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic and refused the request.

Rose: We've got casualties. We've got to use Blue Sword [operational name for air strikes] to get them out, otherwise they will all be killed - we need air strikes now.

Akashi: How about Dr. Karadzic ordering an immediate cease-fire, allowing immediate evacuation of our people?

Rose: By the time the message gets to the units on the ground they will all be either dead or captured.³¹

During a lull in the fighting, Corporal Fergus Rennie, who later died from gunshot wounds to the head, was airlifted out of the enclave and flown to Sarajevo. The following day, on 16 April 1994, a UK Sea Harrier was shot down by an SA-7 as it was attempting to conduct an air strike. The pilot parachuted to safety on Muslim territory and was returned to his ship. On 17 April 1994, SRSg Akashi negotiated a cease-fire agreement for Gorazde. The Bosnian Serbs agreed to release all UN personnel and to withdraw their forces from Gorazde in an unspecified time frame. On 22 April 1994, NATO ordered the Bosnian Serbs to immediately halt attacks on Gorazde and to remove all forces

within three kilometers of the town center. NATO also ordered the Bosnian Serbs to remove all heavy weapons within twenty kilometers of the town center by 26 April. It was a repeat performance of the Sarajevo crisis with slight modifications. SRSG Akashi secured an agreement from the Bosnian Serbs to end hostilities in Gorazde, and once again, UNPROFOR interpositioned its forces between the warring factions along the new confrontation line within the safe area. BHC sent a battalion of peacekeepers into the enclave to implement the cease-fire. NATO, tiring of the "peace by piece approach," agreed to expand the threat of airstrikes to cover all of the UN safe areas.

The Bihac Crisis

The Bihac Pocket lies on the northwestern-most tip of Bosnia. The pocket is approximately thirty miles from north to south and twenty miles at its widest point. This region has always had a predominantly Muslim population and probably the most complex political situation of any area in Bosnia. The city of Bihac, after which the pocket is named, was designated a safe area in June 1993 to protect its population of 60,000 people. The entire pocket is surrounded by Croatian Serbs to the west and Bosnian Serbs to the east. To complicate the matter, the Muslims within the pocket are divided into two warring factions. The faction based in the city of Bihac is loyal to the Bosnian Government in Sarajevo, and the opposing faction is based in the northern city of Velika Kladusa and is loyal to Bosnian Muslim leader Fikret Abdic. In September 1993, Fikret Abdic, a former Bosnian President, declared independence for his northern enclave and

titled it the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia (APWB). He was on excellent terms with the neighboring Croatian and Bosnian Serbs and formally concluded peace agreements with them in October 1993. He then proceeded to wage a nine-month war with Bosnian loyalists in the southern sector of the Bihac pocket.

In August 1994, the cease-fire in Sarajevo was beginning to exhibit signs of stress. Bosnian Serb and Muslim sniper activity resumed in the city and there were numerous instances of Bosnian Serb heavy weapon violations in the Sarajevo Total Exclusion Zone (the twenty kilometer area surrounding the city). The Bosnian Serbs were feeling isolated and frustrated. Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic had refused to accept the Contact Group plan which allocated 51% of the country to the Muslim-Croat Federation and 49% to the Bosnian Serbs. As a result, the Contact Group (representatives from the US, UK, France, Russia and Germany) refused to conduct any further negotiations with the Bosnian Serbs. The 51/49 plan was a nonnegotiable "take it or leave it" offer from the Contact Group. The Bosnian Serbs opted to leave it. This, in turn, angered Serbian President Milosevic, who had been promised relief from the crushing international sanctions imposed by the UN, if the Bosnian Serbs accepted the offer. Milosevic retaliated on 4 August 1994, by closing the border to the Bosnian Serbs and refusing to let any fuel, ammunition and even Bosnian Serb officials cross into or out of Serbia. The Bosnian Serbs were cut off diplomatically, economically and militarily.

The BiH V Corps, based in Bihac, seemingly defeated Abdic's forces in August and began to prepare for a breakout from the pocket

that would initiate UNPROFOR's Bihac crisis. On 25 October 1994, the BiH V Corps stunned the world by launching a successful offensive from the Bihac pocket, freeing hundreds of square miles of formerly occupied Bosnian Serb territory. In conjunction with HVO forces in the south, the V Corps scored the biggest Muslim victory in the war. General Rose expressed reservations about the initial BiH successes, believing they had overextended themselves, and questioned the wisdom of launching an attack from a UN designated safe area. He told the BiH, "if you are going onto the offensive at the operational level, make sure that you can sustain the action."³² Within three weeks, the Bosnian Serbs had regrouped, regained all of their lost territory, and began to shell Bihac in an attempt to destroy the BiH V Corps, once and for all. This turn of events placed many of the western countries that publicly supported the Bosnian Muslims in an awkward situation.

General Rose conducted cease-fire negotiations with the Bosnian Serbs and warned them that they risked NATO airstrikes if they continued to shell the civilian population in the Bihac safe area. Strangely enough, the geographic boundaries for the Bihac safe area or for any UN safe area had never been defined and had always been left deliberately vague. BHC defined the six areas and formally sent the map coordinates to UNPROFOR headquarters in Zagreb. The coordinates were then forwarded to UN headquarters in New York, but no response was ever received.³³ BHC then drafted a map with what they felt the geographic boundaries of the Bihac safe area were and presented it to BSA General Mladic. The BSA continued to shell Bihac and, on several occasions, the Croatian Serbs launched airstrikes from across the

border against targets in the Bihac Pocket. These air attacks were a violation of the NATO enforced No Fly Zone. On November 21, NATO jets bombed the Croatian Serb airbase at Udbina, Croatia. Two days later, after numerous instances of Bosnian Serb air defense radars targeting NATO aircraft, airstrikes were launched against several BSA surface-to-air-missile sites near the Bihac Pocket. The Bosnian Serbs immediately retaliated by seizing all UNPROFOR personnel in their territory, blocking all humanitarian aid and UN supply convoys, and threatening NATO aircraft with intense air defense activity.

On 27 November 1994, US Secretary of Defense Perry conceded that the Bosnian Serbs could not be stopped by airpower alone, and concluded that there was "no prospect" of the Muslim Army winning back any of the territory controlled by the Bosnian Serbs.³⁴ His comments vindicated General Rose's policy of using force, which had been subject to intense criticism in previous months for not requesting massive NATO airstrikes against the Bosnian Serbs. General Rose admitted that there had been tremendous pressure inside and outside of Bosnia "to get me to change away from a peacekeeping mission to an enforcement mission. But beyond a certain line I will not go. If you like, I've been the iron man standing in the middle of this war, refusing to move off the line."³⁵ General Rose often stated that UNPROFOR would not cross the "Mogadishu Line," a not too subtle reminder of the disastrous situation US forces in Somalia got themselves into when they ceased to remain neutral and became combatants. He was determined that would not happen in Bosnia.

On 30 November 1994, Secretary General Boutros-Ghali traveled to Sarajevo to try to salvage the situation. A crowd of Sarajevans booed and screamed at him, and Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic refused to meet with him. The failure of the Secretary General's trip caused renewed speculation that UNPROFOR would soon withdraw from Bosnia. In December, Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic sent a delegation to Plains, Georgia to solicit former President Carter's assistance in resolving the situation in Bosnia. The Bosnian Serbs would not stop their onslaught against Bihac for anything less than a twelve-month, country-wide cessation of hostilities. The Bosnian Government wanted to negotiate a local cease-fire that would only apply to Bihac, and so not freeze the confrontation lines to the BSA's advantage. Former President Carter negotiated a four-month, countrywide Cessation of Hostility Agreement (COHA), effective 1 January 1995.

On 24 January 1995, General Rose became the first B-H Commander to complete his tour. He turned over command to General Rupert Smith (UK) a reorganized organization that had met its humanitarian aid targets, preserved the UN safe areas, lifted the siege of Sarajevo, and ended the fighting between the Bosnian Croats and Muslims. The first country-wide cessation of hostilities was in effect and holding. General Rose urged his successor "to keep faith with the peace process."³⁶ General Rose's tour of duty had its share of problems, including numerous rifts between BHC and NATO regarding the use of force, and as he later admitted, he did not win the information war. The absence of a professional Public Information Office at BHC, the hostile warring faction's control of the local media, and the UN's lack

of funding and resources were major reasons for this failure. At a press conference in London after his return to England, he stated that he

regretted not spending enough time getting a more robust message across about the UN's heroic successes in Bosnia and the sacrifices being made by UNPROFOR troops and aid workers in the face of constant propaganda from the various factions.³⁷

The failure to win the information war is examined in greater detail in chapter four of this paper. In reviewing General Rose's accomplishments, Defense Minister Rifkind reminded UNPROFOR critics that 12 months ago Sarajevo was under continuous artillery bombardment. He stated that under General Rose's command

the UN has now helped to restore water, gas and electricity supplies and get the trams running again, and in central Bosnia, the UN has been supervising a cease-fire which has allowed over 1,000 kilometers of roads to be built and repaired, schools to be reopened and refuse to be collected³⁸

¹LTG Rose's comments to author and BHC staff at the Sarajevo Residency on 21 February 1994.

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⁷"British U.N. commander clears Serbian roadblock," The Stars and Stripes, 4 February 1994, 10.

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¹⁶LTG Michael Rose, "Transition From War to Peace," Campaign Plan, February 1994, 1.

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²⁴Adams, 22.

²⁵Adams, 22.

²⁶Adams, 22.

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²⁹Yossef Bodansky, "How Gorazde was sacrificed to help bring the US into the Bosnian War," Defense and Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, May 1994, 9.

³⁰Ian Traynor, "Beast of Bosnia," The Guardian, 19 April 1994, 8.

³¹Loyd, "Universal Soldier," 11.

³²LTG Michael Rose, Sarajevo, to author, London, 27 December 1994. Transcript in the author's hand.

³³BHC G-2 LTC John Sray, interview by author, April 1996, Fort Leavenworth, handwritten notes on draft thesis.

³⁴Paul Horvitz, "Serbs Cannot Be Stopped U.S. and UN Concede," International Herald Tribune, 28 November 1994, 1.

³⁵Patrick Bishop, "Gen Rose under fire from all sides in conflict," The Daily Telegraph, 11 November 1994, 21.

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CHAPTER THREE
THE WARRING FACTIONS

This is the Balkans. Nothing is what it seems.

Lieutenant General Rose, The
Guardian

Introduction

In 1994, BHC employed a wide variety of tactics, ranging from local negotiations to calling for NATO airstrikes in order to achieve its mission. The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the reactions of the warring factions to UNPROFOR operations in 1994. Throughout the war in Bosnia, Bosnian Serbs and Muslims fired at aircraft carrying humanitarian aid into Sarajevo and launched numerous mortar attacks on the runway at Sarajevo airport in order to stop air delivery of humanitarian aid. All three warring factions employed women and children, administrative checkpoints, and minefields to block the delivery of humanitarian aid by land. UN peacekeepers in Bosnia were targeted by snipers, taken captive by all three warring factions, and were constantly vilified and accused of taking sides in the conflict by Bosnian Serb, Croat, and Muslim propaganda machines. Peacekeepers in Bosnian safe areas were shelled and starved and sometimes killed in their daily efforts to enforce UN mandates. The Bosnian Serb Army was by no means the sole culprit in the quasi-war against UNPROFOR, but it certainly was the most powerful.

Bosnian Serb Army (BSA)

The Bosnian Serb Army in 1994 was better organized, structured, and disciplined than any of the other warring factions. It was organized into six regional corps, with a seventh unattached Uzice Corps that was not formally part of the BSA, but reinforced any major offensive actions such as the attack against Gorazde in April 1994.² The Army consisted of approximately 70,000 troops broken down into three categories: regulars who have signed up for a fixed term, militia who normally serve two weeks before returning home, and irregulars who are lightly armed, largely autonomous, and mostly from Serbia. The Army headquarters is located in Han Pijesak, northeast of Pale and is commanded by Colonel General Ratko Mladic. The 1st Bosnian Corps is headquartered in Bijeljina, the Drina Corps is based in Zvornik, 1st Krajina Corps is from Banja Luka, 2nd Krajina Corps is at Bosanska Grahovo, the Herzegovina Corps is in Gacko, and the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps conducts operations against Sarajevo from its headquarters in Sokolac.

The BSA is the best equipped of all the factions due to its connections with Serbia and the Former Yugoslavian Army (JNA).³ It is also the best trained, in that it has the highest proportion of JNA-trained officers. Its greatest weakness is its size due to the small Bosnian Serb population base. The bulk of the BSA are tied down manning the extensive confrontation lines around central Bosnia, the eastern enclaves, and Bihac. The Bosnian Serbs were victims of their own success. They had captured over 70 percent of Bosnia and were now straining to keep it. Their forces remain overstretched and have great

difficulty massing to obtain further gains. BSA units are best characterized as equipment and weapon-heavy and manpower-light.

The BSA has the most unified command and control structure of the warring factions but suffers from a shortfall of trained officers and a tough geographic environment with limited lines of communication (LOCs). This often causes delay and confusion with UNPROFOR when issues such as convoy passage, cease-fire arrangements, and NATO airstrikes, are involved.

The BSA's overarching strategy against the UN was to restrict the amount of humanitarian assistance rendered to the other warring factions while maximizing the flow of assistance to its own people. They employed snipers in Sarajevo to break the will of the civilian population by restricting freedom of movement in the city. BSA checkpoints held up humanitarian aid convoys, robbed UN peacekeepers, and restricted UNPROFOR's presence in Serb-held regions. The BSA conducted military operations against UN-designated safe areas, cut off utilities (gas, electricity, water) to these areas, took UN peacekeepers hostage, and threatened their lives. Although most people were aware of the BSA's overt hostility to UNPROFOR, they were unaware that the Bosnian Muslim Army (BiH) accorded similar treatment to peacekeepers in Bosnia.

Bosnian Muslim Army (BiH)

The BiH went through a tremendous reorganization in 1993 and began 1994 in considerably better shape than it had been.⁴ The army was formed out of the remnants of the JNA Territorial Defense Force (TDF), which means it was lightly armed and consisted largely of reserve and

militia forces. The systemic stripping of equipment and weapons by the largely Serb JNA in 1991 left the force severely underequipped when war broke out in April 1992.⁵ In 1994, BiH units were relatively well equipped with small arms, but were underequipped with artillery and tanks.

The BiH reorganized extensively in the fall of 1993. The multiethnic Supreme Command was purged so that most senior level commanders were Bosnian Muslims. The BiH originally consisted of a large criminal element in Sarajevo. When the war broke out in the capital in 1992, the criminals were the best organized and armed force that fought for the government. By the summer of 1993, the extortion, black market activities and brutal assaults at BiH checkpoints had turned UNPROFOR and the general populace against two brigades in the BiH that were led by criminals. When Haris Silajdzic assumed the office of Bosnian Prime Minister, he did so on the condition he could eliminate those criminals and end the state of lawlessness in Sarajevo. On 16 October 1993, UNMOs in Sarajevo were attacked and their vehicle was destroyed by the renegade 10th Brigade commanded by "Caco," a former criminal who had served eight years in jail for rape. When UNPROFOR troops attempted to rescue the trapped UNMOs, the 10th Brigade attacked them and hijacked their armor vehicles. The following day, the commander of the renegade 9th Brigade "Cello," launched mortar attacks within the city against the rival 10th Brigade. On 20 October 1994, after a massive battle between loyalist troops and the two criminal brigades, Caco was shot dead and Cello arrested.⁶ Both brigades were purged and the BiH started to reorganize. This incident

is an excellent example of the discipline, command and control, and internal problems the Bosnian Army faced throughout the country.

By 1994 the BiH consisted of 60,000 men in active service and 120,000 in reserve, with 50,000 only lightly armed.⁷ The army was organized into six corps consisting of 76 brigades. The brigades were raised on a territorial basis and organized and equipped by local municipalities. Subsequently, in many cases the town mayor was the brigade commander. The BiH lack heavy weaponry. It was believed they had as few as eighty-five tanks, one hundred and thirty APCs and three hundred heavy guns by the end of 1993. Compare this with the roughly 330 tanks, 400 APCs and 800 pieces of artillery controlled by the BSA, and the BiH's dilemma is clear.⁸

The BiH doctrinally position their mortars, headquarters and military forces next to and within hospitals, schools and UNPROFOR troop locations. The heavily outgunned BiH rely primarily on winning the media war in Sarajevo. In early 1994, BiH forces routinely instigated massive retaliation against the city by firing two to three mortar shells every hour at BSA positions on the mountains surrounding Sarajevo. This enabled the Bosnian Government to present itself as an innocent victim through the media.

In 1994, the BiH overarching strategy against the UN appeared to consist of obtaining the maximum amount of humanitarian aid for its own people, while discrediting the United Nations. The BiH attempted to maintain a delicate balance between launching military offensives and preserving its status as a victim in the eyes of the international community. BiH forces have been caught red handed sniping at UN forces and their own citizens in Sarajevo, mortaring the Sarajevo Airport, and

preventing humanitarian agencies from reestablishing utilities to the city of Sarajevo. BiH activities can be accurately described as biting the hand that feeds it. Bosnian Muslims have employed women and children to block humanitarian aid convoys, and have used their forces to restrict UNPROFOR's freedom of movement from places it wishes to leave or places it needs to go to.

Croatian Defense Council (HVO)

The Bosnian Croat Army, or HVO, was formed from the Croatian community in Bosnia during 1991-1992. Each municipality formed its own brigade and deployed it in a local operational zone.⁹ There are four operational zones located throughout Bosnian Croat-controlled territory. Each operational zone consists of approximately six brigades. The local brigade consists of several hundred men and retains a high degree of autonomy. Most of the HVO senior staff are Croatian Army (HV) officers on temporary duty in Bosnia.¹⁰ They routinely wear Velcro unit crests which are swapped out depending on whether they are in Croatia or Bosnia. The HVO was extremely well-equipped in 1994 by the HV with tanks and artillery. It was believed they had between two hundred and fifty and five hundred tanks, four hundred to six hundred APCs and two thousand artillery pieces of which five hundred were heavy guns. The wide disparity in numbers reflected the continuous dilemma that analysts faced in attempting to distinguish HVO from HV equipment. Depending on the geographic location of an HVO brigade, it could be allied with either Bosnian Serbs or Bosnian Muslims. In the Mostar region, HVO and BSA units would routinely rent

each other's artillery pieces to conduct their missions against the BiH.

With the exception of central Bosnia, Bosnian Croats have operated relatively independently of UN humanitarian assistance. Croatia has openly supported Bosnian Croats with weapons, ammunition, foodstuffs and needed supplies. The HVO has interfered with humanitarian aid flowing through its territory to Bosnian Muslims in Mostar and has bombarded peacekeepers in that city since fighting erupted there in October 1992. Mostar was the site of bitter fighting between the Bosnian Croat and Muslim communities and both factions seized UN peacekeepers as hostages, blocked humanitarian aid convoys and fired at UNPROFOR soldiers. The Bosnian Croatian enclaves in central Bosnia are wholly dependent on UN humanitarian aid to survive and were sometimes used by UNPROFOR to apply pressure on the Bosnian Croat leadership to resolve humanitarian aid problems in Mostar and environs.

Conclusions

The UN is not viewed as a neutral party by any of the three warring factions. UN forces did not have complete freedom of movement, and humanitarian assistance was used as a weapon by the various factions against each other. UN peacekeepers were targeted and harassed by all factions and were often robbed enroute to their destinations. All factions understandably viewed humanitarian aid (food, fuel, clothing) as a source of power and were reluctant to allow these assets to pass through their territory enroute to another warring faction. In order to prevent the delivery of aid to their enemies,

they employed minefields, women and children, and a complex network of checkpoints to delay, harry and rob humanitarian aid convoys. The warring factions deliberately coordinated attacks against the Sarajevo Airport, humanitarian convoys and the civilian population in order to routinely gain advantage. Peacekeepers were routinely taken as hostages whenever the UN or NATO took retaliatory measures and humanitarian assistance to the general population generally ceased for extended periods of time after NATO airstrikes. The warring factions routinely cut off utilities such as gas, electricity and water to rival civilian population centers and sometimes deprived their own people of these services for public relations purposes.

¹John Simpson, "A good man out of Bosnia," The Guardian, 23 January 1995, 20.

²"The Serbian Army in Bosnia and Herzegovina," Jane's Intelligence Review POINTER, May 1994, 3.

³Bosnia Country Study, Janes Information Group 1993, 10.

⁴"The Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina," Jane's Intelligence Review POINTER, March 1994, 3.

⁵Milan Vego, "The Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina," Jane's Intelligence Review, February 1993, 63.

⁶"Aspects of the Civil War in Bosnia and Hercegovina," UNPROFOR Research Paper, 22.

⁷"The Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina," Jane's Intelligence Review POINTER, March 1994, 3.

⁸All equipment numbers in this chapter are based on the UN's unclassified Order of Battle figures for 1994.

⁹Bosnia Country Study, Janes Information Group 1993, 11.

¹⁰Bosnia Country Study, Janes Information Group 1993, 11.

CHAPTER 4

ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND SETBACKS

Introduction

The advent of 1994 appeared to be the nadir of UNPROFOR's effectiveness in Bosnia. The flow of humanitarian aid slowed as the warring factions, hindered by the winter weather, began to emphasize disrupting UNPROFOR's operations over direct fighting against each other. Safe areas, particularly Sarajevo, were "subject to savage and increasing shelling" throughout December 1993, and it continued into January 1994.¹ UNPROFOR's Sector Sarajevo headquarters located in the city's PTT building narrowly averted disaster on New Year's day, when fifteen minutes into the new year, a BSA tank shell smashed into it, destroying an empty storeroom. The room next door was filled with hundreds of UNHCR workers and UNPROFOR peacekeepers celebrating the New Year. UN personnel were celebrating the arrival of 1994 with the impression that things could only get better.

The UNHCR delivered less than half of the food requirements for Bosnia in December 1993. Convoy attacks occurred with regularity and the warring factions gave excuses, increasingly bordering on absurdity, for obstructing humanitarian aid. In mid-December 1993, a UNHCR convoy was prevented from entering the Muslim controlled enclave of Tesanj, in northern Bosnia. The local Bosnian Serb commander explained that

Muslim shells had continually struck the exact same spot on the road into the enclave, rendering it impassable. The UNHCR convoy leader examined the alleged "crater" and reported that it was obviously a man-made trench, that in no way resembled a shell crater. On 5 January 1994, over 1,300 shells rained onto Sarajevo, killing 46 people in the city within the first week of the new year. The PTT building was the target of small arms fire on 10 January, with numerous rounds striking the UNHCR radio room. Fortunately, no one was hurt during the attack. This deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Bosnia, and the increased threat to all UN personnel, was encapsulated in the Special Envoy's end-of-year message to UNHCR staff and partners. In previous years, the message had been extremely positive and optimistic in its outlook, but on the advent of 1994 it read as follows:

Particularly with the operation in B-H, it is easy to feel overwhelmed by the size of the obstacles and the scale of injustices. Yet the values we defend are in no way diminished just because they may not prevail over the logic of war. And for every action frustrated and obstructed by that logic, there are many positive achievements whose impact touches individual lives for the better. Please remember that this will not change, however difficult the next few months may be.²

The humanitarian organizations were not the only ones feeling discouraged about Bosnia. Many of the troop-contributing nations openly stated that they would withdraw their peacekeepers by the spring of 1994 if the situation did not improve. This was the situation in late January 1994, when Lieutenant General Rose arrived in Sarajevo, with a campaign plan to reverse the turn of events in Bosnia. The plan offered five options or directions that B-H Command could take. The first option was to withdraw, if the belief was that the costs of

continuing the operation outweighed any gains of continuing it. The second option was to maintain the status quo, and attempt to outlast the warring factions. Option three recommended a change to the mandate and UNPROFOR's force structure to conduct peace enforcement operations. The fourth, and recommended, option was titled "Towards Peace," and recommended an organizational shakeup, a better synchronization of all UN activities, and a proactive approach to peacemaking. The fifth, and last option, was to continue to prepare to implement a peace plan, should one ever be agreed to between the belligerents. The campaign plan assessed that the third option (Peace Enforcement) was a nonstarter with the troop-contributing nations, and that the second option (Status Quo) was not successful enough to be acceptable. It recommended that contingency planning continue for the first option (Withdrawal) and fifth option (Peace Plan Implementation), and that all efforts be directed towards the fourth option and peace.

Campaign Plan Parameters

One should not get the impression that BHC's campaign plan was the overarching plan that dictated all actions in the theater. Any campaign plan, and especially one in a peacekeeping operation, must address diplomatic, political, economic, humanitarian as well as military issues. In a complex operation such as UNPROFOR's (thirty-five troop-contributing nations located in Croatia, Bosnia, and Macedonia), the SRSG was nominally in charge of four components (Civil Affairs, Division of Management and Administration, Military, UNHCR) which in many cases reported directly to their main headquarters in New

York or Geneva (Division of Management and Administration and UNHCR). Civil Affairs was charged with negotiating political and diplomatic settlements among the warring factions in Bosnia, yet had to compete with uncoordinated initiatives launched by independent groups (Contact Group), countries (Norwegian Initiative), and individuals (former President Carter). The Division of Management and Administration (DMA) was accountable to its headquarters in New York, not the SRSG or Force Commander, and controlled funding for UNPROFOR's personnel and equipment (see figure 2). Consequently, it had a great impact on the peacekeeping force's composition and capabilities. UNHCR reported directly to its High Commissioner in Geneva and was the lead agency in the theater for humanitarian operations. The military's mission was to support everyone. Military commanders often faced ambiguous mandates and troop contingents with nationally imposed constraints on the types of missions they could be used for. UNPROFOR's military commanders worked with forces that were sometimes improperly equipped for the type of missions they would have to execute, as well as with external military forces (NATO) that they did not control. The BHC campaign plan acknowledged all of these aspects of the operation, but concentrated on what the military forces would do to shape the situation in Bosnia in order to assist UNPROFOR to reach the desired end state of the campaign, which was peace, security and conditions for economic renewal for the country.³

BHC made several restrictive and constraining assumptions, that it felt were necessary in order for the force to maintain its credibility. These restrictions were no different than in any other

peacekeeping operation, but were controversial because, for the first time in history, a peacekeeping operation had tremendous military capability (NATO air support) available to it. BHC assumed that UNPROFOR's mission would remain a peacekeeping mission, based on overall consent for its activities, vice a peace enforcement mission, which was not based on consent and which UNPROFOR was not mandated nor equipped to conduct. General Rose was willing to use NATO airpower only as a measure of last resort to protect peacekeepers under attack (close air support) or to enforce UN mandates (air strikes). He coined the expression "crossing the Mogadishu line," a direct reference to the American-led debacle in Somalia, to warn of the consequences when UN troops changed from being peacekeepers to combatants.⁴ The campaign plan's other assumptions were that the political, economic, and humanitarian situation, as well as the military force level for Bosnia, would remain as the status quo.

BHC's mission, as defined by the campaign plan, and based on the mandates was to:

Provide military assistance to UNHCR and approved organizations and agencies involved in humanitarian activities and repair of utilities in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Secure Safe Areas. Establish conditions favorable to: the evacuation of the wounded; and the protection and care of the people; and the improvement of the living conditions of the people; and a cessation of hostilities.⁵

BHC's concept of operations to accomplish its mission consisted of five related lines of action. The concept of operation entitled "Towards Peace," envisioned reorganizing and focusing the command, winning the information war, enforcing mandate compliance, achieving freedom of mobility, and improving humanitarian assistance operations. Its most

significant achievement was the progress it made in improving coordination between the political, peacekeeping and humanitarian components of UNPROFOR, which resulted in the sustainment of the Bosnian people, the containment of the conflict, and the creation of conditions for a peaceful resolution of the conflict. Its deficiencies were the loss of the information war, inability to maintain freedom of movement, and erosion of BHC's credibility to enforce mandate compliance. This paper will now examine the achievements and deficiencies of each of the campaign plan's five lines of action.

Direction and Organization

In Reengineering the Corporation, Michael Hammer and James Champy describe how to radically redesign an organization's structure, processes and culture to achieve a quantum leap in performance. They define reengineering as "the fundamental rethinking and radical redesign of business processes to achieve dramatic improvements in critical contemporary measures of performance."⁶ The campaign plan for Bosnia proposed to reengineer BHC. At first glance, the campaign plan's recommended course of action "Towards Peace" appeared to be merely an enhancement or modification of the status quo, to improve the efficiencies of the organizations in Bosnia. The UN is more comfortable approving a modest proposal instead of a radical one. In reality, what General Rose was proposing was not superficial change, but reengineering. An excellent example of this was the restructuring of BHC.

As previously stated, BHC Headquarters was located in Kiseljak, about 24 kilometers from Sarajevo and in a Bosnian-Croat controlled enclave. Lieutenant General Morillon placed it there in October 1992, to avoid the problems that UNPROFOR Commander General Nambiar faced in Sarajevo. General Nambiar's Sarajevo headquarters had been besieged by the warring factions in 1992, and he was forced to withdraw it to Belgrade and later relocate to Zagreb. General Morillon was looking for a location for the newly created BHC. He noted a large closed down hotel spa, half an hour from Sarajevo, in peaceful conditions near critical road junctions that led to key cities in Bosnia. At the same time, he felt the commander belonged in the center of Sarajevo for political reasons. Sarajevo was in danger of falling and General Morillon felt his presence served symbolic purposes. He stated

I remembered the advice of certain French great chiefs whom I most admired. In the most critical situation, the chief's place is in the front. I therefore decided to separate my CP into two elements and to install myself with a very light advanced CP in the residence which was mine in April, at the very heart of the besieged city.⁷

General Morillon saw his role as more political than military, and let his chief of staff, British Brigadier Roderick Cordy-Simpson, run BHC. Brigadier Cordy-Simpson brought the staff, which consisted of British, Belgian, Dutch, and US officers, intact from NATO's defunct Northern Army Group in Germany. Consequently, he was able to deploy a well-trained English speaking staff, with all of its office equipment and most of its vehicles to Bosnia within three weeks of the first Security Council Resolution authorizing a BHC. In the ensuing fifteen months, the headquarters in Kiseljak ballooned in size and nationality, incorporating over ten different countries. The eruption of the

Bosnian Croat-Muslim conflict restricted access between Kiseljak and Sarajevo. What was once a thirty minute trip, was now, at best, a dangerous two-hour ride, which the staff at Kiseljak was understandably reluctant to make, into besieged Sarajevo. With limited communications and little contact between the BHC commander in Sarajevo and his primary staff in Kiseljak, BHC HQ lacked direction and focus and the BH Commander became isolated.

The consolidation of BHC HQ in Sarajevo paid immediate dividends in improving the unity of effort throughout the command, and allowed General Rose to give his staff needed direction and focus. In addition, as previously described, the division-level staff at Kiseljak directly controlled the day-to-day operations of battalion-sized units and below that were deployed throughout Bosnia. BHC needed an intermediate-level brigade command to assume this responsibility. This would then allow BHC HQ to operate at the higher tactical and operational levels and to conduct forward planning. General Rose ensured that every staff member and peacekeeper in his command understood that the primary focus of BHC was the delivery of humanitarian aid and the protection of safe areas. He directed BHC to concentrate its efforts in this direction as opposed to its previous focus on the ongoing hostilities between the warring factions. Intelligence, operations and logistics staffs concentrated their efforts on synchronizing UNHCR and NGO humanitarian operations.

The reorganization of BHC created two brigade-sized sectors (Sectors North West and South East) complete with UNHCR coordinators, Civil Affairs offices, liaison officers and non-governmental

organization (NGO) representatives charged with running day-to-day humanitarian operations. Once independent offices or organizations such as UNMOs and the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM), which had focused on monitoring the warring factions actions, were incorporated to serve as humanitarian assistance monitoring teams. Logistics units ranging in size from platoon to battalion were consolidated and came under a centralized command in their respective sectors. The BHC Logistics Coordination Center realigned logistics surplus and shortage across the command, and BHC created and deployed a separate Logistics Support Group (based in Split, Croatia) to push critical assets and material into Bosnia.

The reorganization of BHC was designed to link military and humanitarian operations into a common strategic plan. United Nation peacekeeping operations are notorious for consisting of units segregated by nationality, divided by missions (humanitarian aid workers versus military peacekeepers), usually working at cross purposes instead of pooling assets and working together. UNHCR (the lead agency in theater) operated in Bosnia with its own logistics, communication and personnel program. They had their own chain of command, and their staffs largely distrusted UNPROFOR. The exchange of information on route and weather conditions seldom occurred and coordination between the UNHCR and UNPROFOR in humanitarian aid operations was sporadic. Cooperation between the two organizations occurred at the local level and varied throughout Bosnia. BHC, as a result of the reorganization, was now able to offer considerable support to UNHCR and the NGOs. As a result of the reorganization, BHC

could offer the humanitarian aid organizations more than just escorts and protection. BHC offered an integrated communications system, a convoy operations center, supplies, trucks, fuel, route construction, consultation, and labor. It volunteered to assign additional military staff members to UNHCR offices to help plan and implement their logistics and convoy operations. BHC headquarters began emphasizing joint coordination meetings between UNHCR and UNPROFOR throughout Bosnia at all levels. Humanitarian liaison staff began attending BHC staff meetings.

The United Nations was sometimes its own worse enemy in Bosnia. It operated in a hostile environment with the half-hearted consent of the warring parties with little chance of achieving its mission unless it consolidated, renewed its unity of purpose, coordinated its actions, and executed them with determination and consistency. The campaign plan, by emphasizing the primacy of the humanitarian mission as well as its linkage with BHC's peacekeeping and security missions, focused the command and caused it to synchronize its efforts with the humanitarian aid agencies. The reorganization and relocation of the command eliminated duplication, freed up scarce resources, improved efficiencies for operations, and presented a united front to the warring factions intent on disrupting humanitarian operations.

Public Relations Initiative

It is probably instructive to review the media environment in Bosnia, prior to analyzing the information war that BHC planned to conduct in January 1994. If one can imagine a country where the Ku

Klux Klan controls the media, one can understand the media environment in Bosnia. After the war broke out in Bosnia, the three warring factions fought for control of, and established, their own media outlets for their ethnic constituents. All three warring factions manipulated both the domestic and international media to sustain public support for their cause. Most people are surprised to learn that Bosnia had an extensive domestic media network that continued to operate throughout the war. The Bosnian Muslim media outlets were centered around Sarajevo. The Muslim-controlled sectors of the city had two major newspapers (Oslobodjenje, Vecernje novine), numerous tabloid weeklies (Dani, Bosanski Avaz, Oglas, Sarp), the government-controlled radio and television station (RTVBH), and eight independent FM radio stations.⁸ Outside of Sarajevo, the two newspapers had regional editions in Tuzla and Zenica, and north-eastern Bosnia had several local editions based in Tesanj. There were some 15 to 20 local television stations broadcasting in Muslim-controlled territory outside of Sarajevo.⁹ In Sarajevo, the government controlled the newsprint, shut down stations that broadcasted unfavorable stories, and disciplined local journalists by threatening them with the military draft. The Bosnian Serb and Croat factions retain the same control over their media outlets. The Serb Republic News Agency (SRNA) and Kanal S television were based in Pale and closely collaborated with Belgrade for programming and news¹⁰. The Bosnian Serbs had an extensive media network throughout their territory. The Bosnian Croat news agency (HABENA) and TV Siroki Brijeg were based in Medjugorje. The Republic of Croatia's government-controlled radio and television

network, HRT, openly broadcasted its programs from its newly built television station, HTV, in Bosnian Croat territory.

Subsequently, most residents of Bosnia can and do receive multiple local television and radio stations, and tend to watch and listen to those that cater to their ethnic interests. Quite a few well-to-do residences in Bosnia possessed satellite dishes, which enabled the occupants to watch the US-based CNN and British-based SKY news channels. All three of the warring factions, as well as a preponderance of the international media, tended to portray UNPROFOR in a negative light to their audiences.

The international press is primarily based in Sarajevo. The Bosnian Serbs and Croats severely restrict international journalists in areas under their control. As a result of these restrictions, international coverage, providing a Serbian or Croatian view of an issue, tends to come from reporters based in Zagreb or Belgrade and are far less frequent than coverage from Sarajevo which is almost always favorable to the Bosnian-Muslims. In January 1994, BHC had a small and inexperienced military Public Information Office (PIO) based at the Residency, which conducted a daily press conference at the PTT building for local and international journalists. The PIO consisted of three military officers, two enlisted clerks, and a civilian public relations representative, who worked independently for Civil Affairs. Based on nationality, the military PIO representative, could be, and often was, a reserve officer with little to no prior field experience. In addition to the daily press conference, the PIO also scheduled interviews and public appearances for BHC to promote a positive UN

image to the local population and a worldwide audience. The absence of a professional public affairs staff adversely effected the public perception of the UN in Bosnia.

A public affairs initiative was a key aspect to the Bosnian campaign plan. The object of this initiative was to provide clear and truthful information directly to the civilian population, over the heads of their civilian leaders. The center of gravity for the campaign was the popular will of all parties. In General Rose's opinion, the most important factor in the country was people's attitudes, which BHC hoped to harness for the peace effort. The B-H Commander intended to get the UN's message out by raising his public profile and by adopting a proactive BHC stance with the media. BHC hoped to use the media to push the factions toward peace to galvanize international support. The campaign plan established information goals, coordinated efforts with operational planners, and recommended establishing a UN radio station, similar to the UNTAC arrangement in Cambodia. Ideally, if resources and funding allowed, BHC wanted to establish a television station and UN newspaper.

The plan was dubbed the "Information Initiative" and set the following information goals: positive representation of the humanitarian assistance effort, recognition that the local rebuilding of the civil infrastructure and re-establishment of economic activity was a success, and recognition of the benefits of living in UNPROFOR-secured areas. Other facets of the plan included establishing a quick-response liaison mechanism to pass accurate information to peace negotiators and the widespread overt deployment of liaison teams,

primarily UNMOs. As a Special Air Service officer, General Rose was acutely aware of the important contribution that psychological operations (PSYOP) forces bring to an operation. Special Operations Forces are well versed in integrating PSYOP and public affairs into all operations to control and counter hostile propaganda and disinformation. "PSYOP are planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals."¹¹ BHC was targeting the opinions, emotions, attitudes and behavior of the local populace, media, and warring factions.

PSYOP plays an important role in facilitating cooperation between belligerents and peacekeepers. It assists through persuasion instead of intimidation, by using local information programs such as radio or television broadcasts and newspapers or pamphlets. US Army Special Operations Doctrine states "Failure to achieve PSYOP objectives can mean defeat, regardless of the outcome of military operations."¹² Unfortunately, BHC lacked the funding and resources to conduct effective psychological operations and its requests to the US for PSYOP assets were denied. PSYOP could have helped ensure that BHC objectives and efforts were fully supported and understood by the audience. The absence of a professional Public Information Office at BHC, the hostile warring faction's control of the local media, and the lack of funding and resources to establish UN radio, television and newspapers to convey UNPROFOR's message to its target audience, combined to defeat the campaign plan's information initiative.

Developing Cooperation and Promoting Compliance

BHC hoped to institutionalize the process of enforcing and rewarding mandate compliance by the warring factions. This "carrot and stick" approach sought to condition the behavior of the warring factions to better enable the UN to execute its mission in Bosnia. As detailed in chapter three, all of the warring factions attempted to consistently obstruct the delivery of humanitarian aid and violated the mandated conditions for the establishment of safe areas. The mandate compliance operation of the campaign plan listed the rewards and punishments that BHC could employ. The rewards consisted of progress towards peace, a continuance of UN brokered negotiations and mediations, humanitarian assistance, and restoration and reconstruction of vital infrastructure within Bosnia. BHC wanted to convince the warring factions that they had more to benefit from working with the UN than they did by obstructing it.

As part of the information initiative and as an incentive to the leadership of the warring factions, BHC consistently conveyed the message that the war had reached a culminating point, had lost popular support, and that the UN offered the last best hope for all factions to achieve their legitimate aims. BHC delivered the message to all three warring factions that compliance with UN directives was a precondition for financial assistance and the reconstruction of their country. BHC consistently offered its good offices to all parties in the conflict, and the warring factions continued to make use of them throughout 1994. It was the only organization to consistently remain on speaking terms with all three parties throughout the year. The Contact Group (US, UK,

Russia, France, Germany) broke off negotiations with the Bosnian Serbs in August 1994. The US Ambassador refused to have direct negotiations with the Bosnian Serbs throughout 1994, and the Bosnian Muslims and Serbs were not on speaking terms with the SRSG during intervals of that year. BHC units, from the platoon level to General Rose, continued to conduct business with and negotiate with all three warring factions throughout the duration. The Bosnian Serb leadership, seeking legitimacy yet isolated in Pale, knew that whenever they wanted to advance the peace process, BHC would return their phone calls. The Bosnian Muslims knew that it was a thin blue line that kept the Bosnian Serbs from overrunning some of their safe areas, which protected the BiH and gave them a place to regroup and rebuild their forces. All sides benefited from BHC operations which provided them with food, fuel and humanitarian aid, restored utilities, and rebuilt their schools and roads. General Rose also had the option of recommending to the UN that selective sanctions be lifted against various warring factions, based on their compliance with UN resolutions. BHC leveraged all of these services to the warring factions to obtain compliance with the UN resolutions.

The ultimate penalty that BHC could impose against any of the parties that were obstructing UN forces, was the selective use of force. BHC would employ the minimum level of force, ranging from overrunning a roadblock to NATO airstrikes, to obtain compliance. In 1994, BHC employed force far more frequently than ever before. The use of force was tempered by an advance warning, and was limited to a minimum level to maintain BHC's impartial status. Peacekeeping forces

serve in a region only with the consent of the belligerent parties, and though the judicious use of force, did not make BHC a combatant in the conflict, it did threaten the stability of the operation.

UNPROFOR's efforts to condition the warring factions' compliance to UN resolutions through rewards and penalties had mixed results but was generally effective. All of the safe areas were secured throughout 1994, and attacks on convoys diminished. BHC's ability to maintain a dialogue with the warring factions was essential to resolving many of the crises of 1994. On the other hand, many of the crises, particularly the Bihac crisis, clearly demonstrated the limitations of a peacekeeping operation when belligerent parties are determined to combat each other. UNPROFOR's limited use of force during the Gorazde crisis apparently broke the threshold of deterrence that had protected the safe areas.

BHC always had an unspoken understanding with the Bosnian Muslims regarding safe area security. Full protection for safe areas and convoys required a minimum troop strength of 39,500, close to 25,000 more troops than BHC had assigned to it in March 1994. BHC's mission was to prevent the destruction or loss of the safe areas, but it only had a token presence in the eastern enclaves. It was the NATO air threat that kept the Bosnian Serbs out of the eastern enclave safe areas. The safe areas were supposed to be demilitarized areas designed to protect its civilian occupants. In reality, they served as secure bases from which the Bosnian Muslims launched raids against Bosnian Serb villages. The unspoken understanding was that BHC would pretend

to secure the safe areas and the Bosnian Muslims would pretend to be unarmed.

BHC's use of force against the Bosnian Serb attack on Gorazde revealed the disparity between the penalties a peacekeeping force could inflict and the punishment a belligerent party could absorb. The NATO ultimatum for the Bosnian Serbs to halt attacks on Gorazde resulted in a BHC negotiated cease-fire. BHC was able to negotiate the release of Bosnian Serb-held UN hostages, even after calling for limited airstrikes against the BSA, because it had maintained its credibility as a noncombatant. BHC had employed a minimum level of force, after warning the BSA to cease operations against Gorazde. This allowed BHC to negotiate and implement the Sarajevo Formula cease-fire in the enclave. Had UNPROFOR employed the level of force necessary to defeat the BSA assault on Gorazde, it would have crossed the Rubicon into peace enforcement operations. General Rose responded to the critics who decried BHC's refusal to unleash overwhelming force against the Bosnian Serbs in Gorazde by stating, "You do not fight a war in white vehicles. I do not believe we are in the business of going to war in order to create conditions of peace. And I don't think either the world or the contributing nations would accept that."¹³ The Gorazde crisis, and later the Bihac crisis, demonstrated that BHC could, with the assistance of NATO, promote compliance with UN resolutions. Unfortunately, BHC's dependence on the consent and cooperation of the warring parties diminished the deterrent value of NATO airpower. Once the Bosnian Serbs realized that UNPROFOR would not authorize large scale attacks against them, they lost their fear of NATO airpower.

Achieving Freedom of Mobility

BHC improved its freedom of mobility during 1994. Restrictions on where peacekeepers could go and when they could go there were still in effect, but during 1994, more peacekeepers deployed to critical locations in Bosnia than in previous years and more humanitarian aid got through than ever before. Warring parties restricted UNPROFOR's movements throughout Bosnia for a variety of reasons. Peacekeepers were restricted from areas by all factions when the belligerents were conducting military operations they did not want BHC to know about. These operations ranged from ethnic cleansing to the launching of local offensives. Another reason for blocking freedom of mobility was to restrict the flow of humanitarian aid into a region that was under siege. Relief supplies (fuel, batteries for communication devices, food) for peacekeepers deployed in remote but sensitive regions were often impeded to indirectly restrict their patrols. BHC was routinely unable to use its helicopters, because the warring factions refused to guarantee their safety. Each faction claimed that their opponents would shoot down the aircraft and blame the other side for the deed.

BHC needed freedom of movement for several reasons. Not only did it want to know what was going on in the nether regions of Bosnia, but also due to increased operations in 1994 (monitoring Sarajevo cease-fire, Muslim-Croat cease-fire in Central Bosnia, Gorazde cease-fire), it wanted to create a mobile reserve force to deal with the unexpected. BHC also wanted to narrowly focus and distribute humanitarian aid to specific target audiences. In the past, the restriction of movement all too often caused the UNHCR to rely on the

warring factions for secondary distribution of aid. UNHCR convoys would conduct primary distribution from the UN warehouse to a designated transfer point where local officials would assume control of the aid and distribute it, with little or no UN supervision. This regional aid distribution method often provided supplies for the warring factions and was an inefficient method of delivering assistance. With freedom of movement, the UNHCR and World Food Program could pinpoint locations in dire need of assistance and support them, without supplying the combatants.

When BHC assumed the additional duties of monitoring the Sarajevo cease-fire, Bosnian Croat-Muslim cease-fire, and Gorazde cease-fire, it resulted in the placement of thousands of peacekeepers along the confrontation lines throughout Bosnia. Peacekeepers were deployed north from the Posavina Corridor, throughout Central Bosnia and in the Bosnian Serb-controlled areas surrounding Sarajevo. This massive deployment, resulted in a tremendous increase in UN presence throughout Bosnia and improved freedom of mobility in most areas. Immediately after the Sarajevo cease-fire was implemented, new routes into and out of the city were opened to both peacekeepers and local civilians. The Muslim-Croat Federation agreement eliminated many of the roadblocks and restriction of movement in Central Bosnia.

BHC also launched initiatives to increase freedom of movement. Communication problems accounted for a large number of roadblocks. UNPROFOR and the UNHCR had to obtain convoy clearances prior to moving through territory the different warring factions controlled. In many cases, improper paperwork or miscommunications resulted in convoys

unable to pass through. BHC placed liaison officers and UNMOs equipped with faxes and radios at key checkpoints, as well as at the warring faction's headquarters, thus cutting through bureaucratic obstacles that had restricted movement in Bosnia. More convoys reached the eastern enclaves in 1994 than in the previous year (229 versus 208 convoys). Over 800 private commercial convoys arrived from the Dalmation Coast to Sarajevo between February and July 1994, flooding the city with foodstuffs and consumer goods.¹⁴ Prices for food in Sarajevo were often cheaper than in Zagreb or Belgrade. BHC's initiatives in conjunction with the robust approach to roadblocks and restrictions to movement that were adopted after the arrival of General Rose resulted in greater freedom of movement in the country than had ever occurred before. That is not to say that convoys were no longer blocked nor peacekeepers obstructed, only that they had greater access to the country in 1994 than at any previous time.

Enhancing Humanitarian Assistance

The campaign plan for Bosnia proposed a number of measures for BHC to adopt in order to enhance humanitarian assistance. Humanitarian assistance is more than food; it includes shelter, social programs, health materials, restoration of utilities, and rebuilding infrastructure (schools, roads, bridges). The purpose of just about every initiative in the campaign plan was to improve the conduct of humanitarian operations. BHC reorganized its structure and refocused its staff to improve coordination between its headquarters and the UNHCR. Surplus equipment and services were offered to all of the

humanitarian organizations, and the Public Information Office reinforced success by directing media attention to UNPROFOR's many achievements in this area. After the Sarajevo cease-fire, BHC made the restoration of the city's utilities a priority operation. The restoration of natural gas, electricity, water, and the tram service was an immense stride towards establishing normalcy in the city and dampening the ethnic hatred that flared throughout the country.

BHC executed a stunning improvement in the humanitarian assistance sector in 1994. Whereas in 1993 only 42.5 percent of the country's food requirements were delivered to Bosnia, in 1994, humanitarian organizations delivered 85 percent of the country's needs.¹⁵ Sarajevo Airport received over 53,830 metric tons (MT) of foodstuffs in 1994, over 11,959 metric tons more than in the previous year.¹⁶ Over 12,960 MT of food came into Sarajevo by road, an increase of more than 3,800 MT from 1993. These numbers do not take into account the thousands of tons of fresh produce the local populace grew from the seeds that were distributed by humanitarian organizations. Starvation was not an issue for Bosnia for 1994.¹⁷ The Sarajevo airlift continued operations throughout 1994, with occasional stoppages due to attacks against the aircraft landing at the airport. BHC's operation of the airport without the loss of a single plane was a remarkable achievement in 1994. The Sarajevo airbridge surpassed the Berlin airlift in total tonnage delivered in late 1994. Sarajevo's UNHCR Chief, Tony Land, acknowledged it would be impossible for his organization to provide aid to the city without the assistance of UNPROFOR.

Conclusion

In December 1994, President Jimmy Carter flew into Sarajevo at the invitation of the Bosnian Serbs and secured their promise to observe a four-month cease-fire. As the New Year approached, the Bosnian Muslims consented to a four-month comprehensive cessation of hostilities agreement (COHA) with the Bosnian Serbs. The two factions had often agreed to limited cease-fires in the past but had never agreed to a countrywide cessation of hostilities before. The people of Sarajevo had sufficient food to make it through the winter, and there were no artillery pieces firing on the city from the surrounding mountains. There was no longer talk of a UN withdrawal from Bosnia, and Great Britain had announced that it would reinforce its presence there with additional men and helicopters. BHC's campaign plan to move Bosnia closer towards peace had improved coordination between the political, peacekeeping and humanitarian components of UNPROFOR, which, in turn, resulted in the sustainment of the local population, the containment of the conflict, and the establishment of conditions for a peaceful resolution to the war.

¹United Nations, UNHCR, Information Notes on former Yugoslavia, 1, January 1994, 6.

²Ibid., V.

³United Nations, BHC HQ, A Campaign Plan For Bosnia Herzegovina Command, Revised 25 Feb 94, p.1. Hereafter referred to as Campaign Plan.

⁴John Darnton, "UN Buildup in Bosnia Eyes Mogadishu Line," New York Times, 7 June 1995, 1.

⁵Campaign Plan, 6.

⁶Michael Hammer and James Champy, Reengineering the Corporation (New York: Harper Business, 1993), 32.

⁷Philippe Morillon, "UN Operations In Bosnia: Lessons and Realities," RUSI, December 93, 33.

⁸Article 19, Forging War: The Media in Serbia, Croatia and B-H, (Avon: Bath Press, 1994), 211.

⁹Forging War, 212.

¹⁰Forging War, 254.

¹¹U.S. Department of the Army, Doctrine for Army Special Forces, FM 100-25, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), glossary-23.

¹²FM 100-25, 3-17.

¹³Peter Almond, "We came to keep peace, not fight a war, says Rose," Daily Telegraph, 19 April 1994, 10.

¹⁴David Rieff, "Dateline Sarajevo: War and Peace," in The Black Book of Bosnia, ed. Nader Mousavizadeh (New York: Basic Books, 1996), 105.

¹⁵United States General Accounting Office, Briefing Report to the Majority Leader, US Senate, Peace Operations: Update on the Situation in the Former Yugoslavia, (GSAO/NSIAD95-148BR, May 1995), 29.

¹⁶UNHCR Information Notes, Dec 1994, 14.

¹⁷United Nations, World Food Program, WFP In The Former Yugoslavia, Situation Report 13, Jan 95, 7.

CHAPTER FIVE

KEY FINDINGS

Several key findings emerge after examining BHC's peacekeeping operations in Bosnia during 1994. One of them is that campaign planning is at least as important to the success of peacekeeping operations as it is to theater combat operations.¹ The campaign plan translates the UN Security Council resolutions into a military mission that will achieve a designated end state. Most of BHC's significant achievements were the result of following the plan and focusing on its mission. Another key finding is the importance of conducting an effective information initiative. Limited funds and resources are a significant constraint in this area. Many critics of BHC's operations in Bosnia were unfamiliar with the UN mandate, as well as the limitations and capabilities of a peacekeeping force. By reviewing the UN's mandate, UNPROFOR's strategic goals and BHC's objectives, one can conclude that Bosnian peacekeeping operations were relatively effective (see Figure 3). BHC's actions during 1994 resulted in a tremendous increase in the delivery of humanitarian aid and saved innumerable lives.

BH Command effectively executed its mandated military mission in Bosnia in 1994. BHC had a threefold mission: secure and operate Sarajevo Airport, escort and protect humanitarian aid convoys, and

secure safe areas. When General Rose departed Sarajevo in January 1995, the airport was secure and operational and had flown in more humanitarian aid in the previous twelve months than at any other time during the conflict. No aircraft were lost to hostile fire during the twelve months that UNPROFOR operated the Sarajevo airbridge. Humanitarian organizations had distributed a record amount of food and humanitarian aid from January 1994 to January 1995. During General Rose's tour in Sarajevo, not a single UN designated Safe Area fell, although there were numerous crises involving them. BHC was responsible for securing six safe areas in January 1994, and through constant negotiation and the judicious use of force, managed to protect all of them from the Bosnian Serbs. It would be disingenuous to state that UNPROFOR's mission in Bosnia was a success because it accomplished its mandated missions. The United Nations did not send a three-star general into Bosnia simply to supervise the distribution of humanitarian aid. The United Nations was in Bosnia to contain the conflict, ameliorate human suffering, assist the population in reconstruction, economic renewal, and peaceful coexistence, and to create the conditions for a lasting peace agreement brought about through step-by-step negotiation. An examination of the record shows that BHC succeeded in making substantial progress towards the UN mandate, leading towards peace in Bosnia.

Peacekeeping operations by definition do not result in clear cut victories or failures. Peacekeepers are in the country by the common consent of the belligerent parties, and if the peacekeeping process fails, it is the warring factions, which have destroyed their

own agreements, that are to blame. Upon General Rose's return to London, he was asked at a press conference if he had been humiliated by the Bosnian Serbs. His reply was that of the quintessential peacekeeper, "I don't understand the word humiliation. How can peacekeepers be humiliated? We're not a warfighting force. When we are working for peace on behalf of the people of that nation, how can we be humiliated?" Rose went on to explain that if someone with a gun stopped a humanitarian aid convoy, "then he is humiliating himself in the face of his country."² It is this indeterminate conclusion to peacekeeping operations that frustrates the media which prefers the simplicity of win or lose, when it comes to military operations. This study examined the peacekeeping operation in Bosnia during General Rose's tenure in 1994 to examine how effective his command was and how BHC accomplished its strategic goals.

BHC's strategy to achieve the end state of peace, security and the creation of conditions for economic renewal for the people of Bosnia, consisted of five lines of action; reengineer the organization and refocus it on humanitarian assistance, launch an information initiative, shape the belligerent parties behavior with carrots and sticks, achieve freedom of movement, and improve the efficiency of humanitarian operations by synchronizing all the agencies in Bosnia.

BHC reorganized itself, consolidated its headquarters at one location, and established an intermediate level of command (Sector Sarajevo, Sector Southwest, Sector Northeast) to take care of day-to-day operations, freeing itself to do higher-level operations and conduct forward planning. This reengineering of the organization's

structure performed brilliantly in March 1994, with the unexpected cease-fire and creation of a federation between the Bosnian Croats and Muslims. BHC had a confidence-building mechanism in place, when it positioned its peacekeepers between the warring parties, monitored the removal of heavy weapons from the confrontation lines, and conducted joint patrols during those vulnerable hours after the cease-fire was established. The sector commands established regional and district joint commissions to resolve any problems that arose during the initial weeks of the agreement. Although the US brokered the agreement between the Bosnian Croats and Muslims, it was BHC which planned and executed the operation that preserved a fragile peace between those two warring factions.

BHC attempted to employ an information initiative to present UNPROFOR's side of the picture to the domestic and international media. The UN was unwilling to fund and resource this critical asset. The domestic media in Bosnia is tightly controlled by the warring factions and extremely anti-UN. Armed with an inexperienced PIO staff, which was unable to deliver UNPROFOR's version of events to the world-wide media, Rose freely admits that this is an area in which he should have done better, and which the UN must make a priority for future peacekeeping operations. BHC wanted to establish a local newspaper, radio station and television station to deliver its message to the local populace. The lack of resources resulted in many of BHC's humanitarian and civil infrastructure achievements going unnoticed and left Rose unable to counter the propaganda effort engineered by the warring factions. BHC did do an excellent job of establishing quick-

response information cells and created an extensive liaison network to communicate among the belligerent parties.

BHC's use of the carrot and the stick to shape the warring faction's behavior achieved limited success in increasing humanitarian aid by improving freedom of movement. Peacekeeping has strict rules for the use of force, and these limitations failed to deter the Bosnian Serbs from retaliating against Muslim attacks from the Safe Areas of Gorazde and Bihac. The inability to force the Bosnian Serbs to cease their offensive actions against the safe areas made UNPROFOR appear impotent. UNPROFOR refused to unleash the full capabilities of NATO airpower, in order to avoid becoming a combatant in the ongoing hostilities. Despite maintaining its credibility as a unbiased force operating in Bosnia with the consent of the warring parties, the media portrayed the UN as a disorganized group that had been humiliated in the eyes of the world.

BHC experienced its greatest achievements in the humanitarian area, dramatically increasing the flow of aid into the country and exceeding all previous levels of assistance. Peacekeepers restored utilities throughout the country, rebuilt schools, churches, roads and bridges. BHC increased the amount of humanitarian aid into Bosnia by aggressively focusing on the mission, devoting a preponderance of its assets to it, and by increasing its freedom of movement. Peacekeepers aggressively challenged the checkpoints of the warring factions and established a series of liaison teams at key locations equipped to fax the necessary convoy passes from Pale to the checkpoint.

BHC's use of a campaign plan resulted in a significant improvement in the coordination between the political, peacekeeping and humanitarian components of the UN in Bosnia and resulted in a significant advance in the progress towards peace. The absence of a permanent UN-negotiated peace settlement in the Balkans has probably immutably marked UNPROFOR's peacekeeping operations there as a failure. A closer examination of the record clearly demonstrates that substantial progress was made towards the achievement of the UN mandate. As previously stated, success and failure are inappropriate measures of peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping operations can be rendered ineffective when the belligerent parties destroy their own set of agreements. Peacekeepers are neither tasked nor equipped to enforce a settlement. BHC's organization, tactics, techniques and procedures offer valuable lessons for future peacekeeping operations in a highly volatile environment. BHC operations were effective in 1994. Peacekeepers executed their mandated military mission and accomplished their campaign plan's strategic goals. Nevertheless, public expectations of the UN's role in the Bosnia were not met. Based on the level of combat activities between the belligerents in Bosnia, a peace enforcement force was necessary to impose a negotiated peace settlement in the region. Pragmatically speaking, given the reluctance of UN members to authorize enforcement actions, BHC's wider peacekeeping type missions will probably be more likely in the future than peace enforcement operations such as Joint Endeavor. Future peacekeeping forces in a volatile environment may be able to contain the conflict, ameliorate human suffering and create the conditions for a lasting

peace agreement by studying BHC's operations in 1994 and applying the lessons learned.

¹The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) recommended that US forces supporting UNPROFOR develop a theater campaign plan for US operations. Center for Army Lessons Learned, Lessons Learned Report: Bosnia Contingency Planning and Training, US Army Combined Arms Command, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, December 1995, 7.

²Michael Evans, "Rose scorns Bosnia critics," The Times, 28 January 1995, 18.

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


Figure 2. UNPROFOR Command Structure

Mandated Military Mission	Effectively Executed	Not Effectively Executed
Secure & Operate Sarajevo Airport	X	
Escort & Protect Aid Convoys	X	
Secure Safe Areas	X	

Strategic Goals	Achieved	Not Achieved
Contain the conflict	X	
Reduce human suffering	X	
Create conditions for a lasting peace agreement	X	
Assist in internal reconstruction & economic renewal	X	

Campaign Plan Objectives	Accomplished	Not Accomplished
Reengineer BHC	X	
Implement an effective information initiative		X
Improve cooperation and promote compliance	X	
Achieve freedom of movement		X
Enhance humanitarian assistance	X	

Figure 3. Accomplishments and Deficiencies

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